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THE CREATIVE DESTRUCTION OF THE “WINNER-TAKE-ALL” SOCIETY?  





Technological change has always impacted the music industry, which is now 
absorbing the destructive effects of the digital revolution. The Internet and MP3s have 
allowed for illegal downloading and file sharing. For producers, revenue streams have run 
dry because consumers can get their music for free. The old property rights regime has been 
eroded for incumbents and a market failure is imminent. But the digital revolution also has 
the potential to create opportunity for entrepreneurial artists and firms who are able to 
utilize new technology for disseminating their content. This dissertation utilizes a random 
sample of recorded music unit sales for 2,051 artists from 2004 to 2008. The data is used to 
test if the digital revolution has created a ‘long tail effect’ where less popular and nascent 
artists enjoy more sales, or a ‘superstar effect’ where a small number of top artists take the 
lion’s share of sales. I find that the market is characterized by an extremely skewed sales 
distribution profile which reaches a peak in both sales and inequality in 2006 while sales and 




effect in non-digital formats across all five years. The ‘middle class’ of artists also declines 
steadily. For property rights, these changes in the sales distribution profile highlight the 
importance of retaining excludability through bundling content together. Bundling can still 








TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
I. Introduction .................................................................................................................................1 
A. Statement of the Problem: Digital Creative Destruction..................................................2 
B. Research Questions ................................................................................................................2 
C. Hypotheses ..............................................................................................................................3 
II. History of the Recorded Music Industry and Review of Empirical Work .......................11 
A. Evolution of the Recorded Music Industry......................................................................11 
B. Technology and the New Property Rights Regime .........................................................21 
C. Literature Review of Empirical Research..........................................................................25 
D. Summary ................................................................................................................................31 
III. Data Collection and Data Description ..............................................................................33 
A. Nielsen Soundscan and Data Collection Procedure........................................................33 
B. Description of the Data.......................................................................................................41 
IV. Empirical Results ..................................................................................................................52 
A. Relative Sales Changes: Is the Pie Sliced Differently?.....................................................52 
B. Absolute Sales Changes .......................................................................................................88 
C. Regression Analysis ..............................................................................................................96 
D. Summary of Results............................................................................................................116 
V. Conclusions..............................................................................................................................122 
A. Problem and Hypotheses ..................................................................................................122 
B. Findings and Implications .................................................................................................124 
C. Limitations of the Study and Future Research...............................................................132 










LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1: Summary of Recorded Music Formats. ...........................................................................42 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Release Dates and Release Years. .........................................43 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Albums, Singles, and Videos: Sales Shares of Specific 
Formats................................................................................................................................................48 
Table 4: The Percent of Total Sales Accruing to Different Quantiles of Artists, 2004-2008. 54 
Table 5: Cumulative Frequencies and % Cumulative Frequencies for Artists, 2004-2008. ....58 
Table 6: The Percent of Total Sales Accruing to Different Quantiles of Titles, 2004-2008...63 
Table 7: Cumulative Frequencies and % Cumulative Frequencies for Titles, 2004-2008. ......67 
Table 8: The Percent of Total Sales Accruing to Different Quantiles of Labels, 2004-2008. 72 
Table 9: Cumulative Frequencies and % Cumulative Frequencies for Labels, 2004-2008......76 
Table 10: Absolute Distributional Changes for Artists: The Distribution Described in Sales 
Units, 2004-2008. ...............................................................................................................................89 
Table 11: Absolute Distributional Changes for Titles: The Distribution Described in Sales 
Units, 2004-2008. ...............................................................................................................................91 
Table 12: Summary Statistics for Artists: Location, Scale, Skewness, Kurtosis, Inter-quartile, 
Left Tail, Right Tail, 2004-2008. ......................................................................................................93 
Table 13: Summary Statistics for Titles: Location, Scale, Skewness, Kurtosis, Inter-quartile, 
Left Tail, Right Tail, 2004-2008. ......................................................................................................95 
Table 14: Synopsis of Artist Sales: Number of Observations, Mean, Standard Deviation, 
Minimum, Maximum. ........................................................................................................................98 
Table 15: Synopsis of Non-zero Artist Sales: Number of Observations, Mean, Standard 
Deviation, Minimum, Maximum......................................................................................................99 
Table 16: Synopsis of Title Sales: Number of Observations, ....................................................100 
Table 17: Synopsis of Non-Zero Title Sales: Number of Observations, Mean, Standard 
Deviation, Minimum, Maximum....................................................................................................101 
Table 18: Regression Results for Artists, 2004-2008...................................................................103 
Table 19: Test of Significance Between Years for Artists. .........................................................105 
Table 20: Regression Results for Titles, 2004-2008. ...................................................................106 
Table 21: Test of Significance Between Years for Titles. ...........................................................108 
Table 22: Regression Results for Non-Zero Artists, 2004-2008. ..............................................109 
Table 23: Test of Significance Between Years for Non- Zero Artists......................................111 
Table 24: Regression Results for Non-Zero Titles, 2004-2008. ................................................113 
Table 25: Test of Significance Between Years for Non- Zero Titles. ......................................115 
Table 26: Synopsis of Data Analysis Conclusions.......................................................................117 
Table 27: The Willingness to Pay for a Bundle is Less Dispersed than the Willingness to Pay 








LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Anatomy of the Long Tail..................................................................................................5 
Figure 2: Illustration of the Superstar and Long Tail Effects........................................................7 
Figure 3: RIAA’s Total Industry Numbers, 1998-2009. ...............................................................16 
Figure 4: RIAA’s Numbers Split up by Format, 1998-2008. .......................................................17 
Figure 5: RIAA’s Numbers Split up by Marketing Channel, 1998-2008. ..................................18 
Figure 6: Total Unit Sales Each Year: All Units, Tracks, Digital, and Non-Digital, 2004-2008.
...............................................................................................................................................................44 
Figure 7: Average Unit Sales for Artists: All Units, Tracks, and Digital, 2004-2008................45 
Figure 8: Average Unit Sales for Titles: All Units, Tracks, and Digital, 2004-2008. ................46 
Figure 9: Unit Sales for the More Popular Formats: Digital, CDs, DVDs, 2005-2008. ..........50 
Figure 10: Unit Sales for the Less Popular Formats: LPs, Cassettes, Maxi CDs, 12 Inch, 
Video Tapes, UMDs, 2005-2008......................................................................................................51 
Figure 11: Percent Cumulative Frequencies – Percent of Total Sales Accruing to 4th through 
9th Deciles of Artist Unit Sales, 2004-2008. ....................................................................................55 
Figure 12: Percent Cumulative Frequencies – Percent of Total Sales Accruing to 91st through 
99th Percentiles of Artist Unit Sales, 2004-2008.............................................................................56 
Figure 13: Percent Cumulative Frequencies – Percent of Total Sales Accruing to 97th through 
100th Percentiles of Artist Unit Sales, 2004-2008...........................................................................57 
Figure 14: Cumulative Frequencies for 4th through 9th Deciles of Artist Sales, 2004-2008.....59 
Figure 15: Cumulative Frequencies for 91st through 99th Percentiles of Artist Unit Sales, 
2004-2008. ...........................................................................................................................................60 
Figure 16: Cumulative Frequencies for 97th through 100th Percentiles of Artist Unit Sales, 
2004-2008. ...........................................................................................................................................61 
Figure 17: Percent Cumulative Frequencies – Percent of Total Sales Accruing to 4th through 
9th Deciles of Title Unit Sales, 2004-2008.......................................................................................64 
Figure 18: Percent Cumulative Frequencies – Percent of Total Sales Accruing to 91st through 
99th Percentiles of Title Unit Sales, 2004-2008...............................................................................65 
Figure 19: Percent Cumulative Frequencies – Percent of Total Sales Accruing to 97th through 
100th Percentiles of Title Unit Sales, 2004-2008. ...........................................................................66 
Figure 20: Cumulative Frequencies for 4th through 9th Deciles of Title Sales, 2004-2008.......68 
Figure 21: Cumulative Frequencies for 91st through 99th Percentiles of Title Unit Sales, 2004-
2008. .....................................................................................................................................................69 
Figure 22: Cumulative Frequencies for 97th through 100th Percentiles of Title Unit Sales, 
2004-2008. ...........................................................................................................................................70 
Figure 23: Percent Cumulative Frequencies – Percent of Total Sales Accruing to 4th through 
9th Deciles of Label Unit Sales, 2004-2008. ....................................................................................73 
Figure 24: Percent Cumulative Frequencies – Percent of Total Sales Accruing to 91st through 
99th Percentiles of Label Unit Sales, 2004-2008. ............................................................................74 
Figure 25: Percent Cumulative Frequencies – Percent of Total Sales Accruing to 97th through 




Figure 26: Cumulative Frequencies for 4th through 9th Deciles of Label Sales, 2004-2008. ....77 
Figure 27: Cumulative Frequencies for 91st through 99th Percentiles of Label Unit Sales, 
2004-2008. ...........................................................................................................................................78 
Figure 28: Cumulative Frequencies for 97th through 100th Percentiles of Label Unit Sales, 
2004-2008. ...........................................................................................................................................79 
Figure 29: Gini Coefficients for Artists, 2004-2008......................................................................81 
Figure 30: Gini Coefficients for Titles, 2004-2008........................................................................82 
Figure 31: Gini Coefficients for Labels, 2004-2008. .....................................................................83 
Figure 32: Gini Coefficients for Artists, Non-zero Sales Only, 2004-2008...............................85 
Figure 33: Gini Coefficients for Titles, Non-zero Sales Only, 2004-2008.................................86 
Figure 34: Gini Coefficients for Labels, Non-zero Sales Only, 2004-2008. ..............................87 
Figure 35: Coefficients on Sales Rank for Artists, 2004-2008. ..................................................104 
Figure 36: Coefficients on Sales Rank for Titles, 2004-2008. ....................................................107 
Figure 37: Coefficients on Sales Rank for Non-Zero Artists, 2004-2008................................110 







For most of the Twentieth Century, the established business model in the music 
industry was one where commercial success necessitated that artists sign contracts with 
major record companies. The structure of the industry was what Frank and Cook (1995) 
called a ‘winner-take-all’ market. There was a two-tiered structure where the top artists 
earned enormous incomes and sold millions of records, while the bulk of artists, most of 
whom were not signed to major companies, were left to divide the remainder of the revenue 
pie. For example, because people are willing to pay much more to see Mick Jagger or Paul 
McCartney perform, or prefer their recordings to those of other artists, people have less to 
spend on live performances or recordings of other artists. Building on the work of Rosen 
(1981), Frank and Cook (1995) argued that the development of a ‘winner-take-all society’ 
threatened to exacerbate income inequality and misallocate resources as more people tried to 
achieve these high incomes but fail.  
At the beginning of the 21st century, a confluence of new digital technology became 
the death knell for the established recorded music industry. Creative destruction has made 
record companies’ business models irrelevant. Digital technology has had an adverse effect 
on other industries as well, such as newspapers. When it comes to music and newspapers, 
consumers now have more choice than ever before and can often access what they want for 




from digital technology because most production and distribution processes are streamlined 
and more efficient. Unfortunately, their revenue streams have dried up in the process 
because scarcity has vanished. This suggests a market failure is present. There is uncertainty 
about how the market will adapt to the new digital paradigm.  
 
A. Statement of the Problem: Digital Creative Destruction 
 
Today, the Internet and digital technology have revolutionized the music industry. 
This has been destructive to old business models. But many artist entrepreneurs have created 
different ways to earn their living in the music business. Signing with a major record 
company is no longer needed when the costs of recording and distributing technology have 
been dramatically reduced. New contractual arrangements and business models are being 
used by both established and new artists. The fundamental research question addressed in 
this dissertation is whether these recent changes in technology coupled with entrepreneurial 
initiative in the form of new business models can change the ‘winner-take-all’ structure and 
create a ‘new artistic middle class’ that will better distribute the revenues generated by the 
industry.  
 
B. Research Questions 
 
Though live performance retains the characteristics and problems of ‘winner-take-all-
markets’, in the past decade, the development of digital technology has dramatically lowered 




increase in supply, which enables consumers to buy more as prices have fallen. But this shift 
also offers the possibility of dramatically increasing the variety of digital recordings available 
as barriers to entry are lowered. This expansion of availability has been labeled ‘the long tail’ 
(Anderson 2006).  Consumers often first learn of a performer through digital recordings 
available online through streaming and recommendation services such as Pandora or 
Rhapsody. Online retailers can also afford to stock more choices. Because of this, the 
potential market for nascent and niche artists is expanded as consumers can more easily find 
new music.  Though this change in supply may enhance the chances of nascent artists 
becoming ‘superstars’, it also means an increased supply of rare or obscure recordings of 
superstars.   
The questions to be answered are the following: 
1) Is there a ‘superstar’ effect in the market for recorded music today and is it 
significantly different from the past? 
2) Is there a ‘long-tail’ effect in the market for recorded music today and is it 
significantly different from the past? 




Much of recorded music is no longer phonograms – in physical form. It is now 
digital data, where production, distribution, inventory, and reproduction costs are 
approaching zero. This may be represented as an outward shift of the industry supply curve. 
Prices are falling not only because costs are going down, but also because consumers do not 




recorded music shifting to the left. Before the digital revolution, there were only physical 
records, which created rivalness and excludability. Poor-quality copies created excludability. 
Now, most recorded music is available for free. With the right technology, consumers can 
reproduce and download recorded music for free without compromising the recording’s 
quality in a meaningful way. This change creates clear disadvantages for many producers of 
music. But for consumers, digital music has lowered prices, increased choice, and created 
new modes of consumption.  
There is clear evidence of an increase in supply, but does digital technology affect 
demand as well by expanding the types of music consumers like? Most of the uncertainty for 
industry operators is about what will happen on the demand side and to the resulting 
distribution of sales. This implies existing business models of incumbent artists and firms 
could be replaced by new business models of entrepreneurial artists and firms who are able 
to better meet demand changes and capture revenue streams from those changes. 
Chris Anderson, former chief editor of ‘Wired’ magazine, wrote a widely influential 
article in 2004 and a subsequent book in 2006 entitled ‘The Long Tail: Why the Future of 
Business is Selling Less of More’. The economics of the long tail refers to the view that the 
rise of Internet commerce, online retailers, and digitization will bring about a new economic 
reality. Hits will matter less and niche markets – the ‘long tail’ of the sales distribution – will 
matter more as a proportion of total sales. This is illustrated by Anderson in Figure 1. 
Digitization applies to different contexts and means the transformation from analog to 
digital form, and most importantly here, data on a computer. Decreased distribution costs 
and inventory carrying costs imply increased supply and increased product variety. In 
response, consumption patterns – demand – will diversify because preferences are better 




larger number of low-volume niche products. This larger number of less-popular products 
will make up a relatively larger proportion of revenues for retailers. 
 
Figure 1: Anatomy of the Long Tail.  
This is from Anderson’s (2004) original article and touts the relative importance of the ‘tail’ of the sales 
distribution as compared to the ‘head’ of the sales distribution. This is justified by the comparison of 
limited brick-and-mortar store offerings compared to digital platforms which have non-rival and more 
diverse inventories. 
 
 In addition, consumer search costs are lowered by online search, recommendation, 
and filtering tools (e.g. Brynjolfsson, Hu, and Simester 2006). This potentially helps less-
known and new artists gain exposure. The earlier work of Joseph Schumpeter explains that 
the entrepreneurs who break up the economic structure are new, small firms coming from 
the outside (Schumpeter 1911, cited in Audretsch 2008). This is observed with digital 
technology as incumbents in the recorded music industry have seen devastating sales 
declines. Entrepreneurial artists and other creators could leverage this situation of creative 




distribution, and consumption should shift the music industry’s balance of power away from 
incumbents and in favor of these entrepreneurs. 
If the long tail theory supposes that consumer preferences are better matched by 
increased variety, then consumers must have diverse tastes, or at least eventually they 
discover these diverse tastes. This may be a tenuous assumption. The superstar hypothesis, 
on the other hand, predicts consolidation of preferences on the most popular products. Low 
popularity products do not sell as much as a dominant choice in the mass market. This 
choice gets stronger through shared consumer preferences and becomes more dominant and 
then sells even more. Imperfect substitution assures this effect (Rosen 1981). Because 
reproduction, i.e. the marginal cost, of a recording is cheap, what is popular becomes 
excessively profitable. Therefore, the rise of Internet commerce, online retailers, and 
digitization should enhance the superstar effect and the winner-take-all model should prevail. 
So, the decline in barriers to entry into larger markets can benefit top performers and well-
capitalized firms disproportionately (Frank and Cook 45). 
Given the changes in technology and institutions in the music industry, what will the 
music industry look like in the future? Will the ‘winner-take-all’ structure enhance superstars 
or will there be an improved distribution of industry revenues? This dissertation evaluates 
three hypotheses about the emerging structure of the industry. 
Hypothesis 1. There is a ‘superstar’ effect in the market for recorded music today. The superstar 
hypothesis is that sales have become relatively more skewed toward hits over time. If the 
distribution of recorded music sales has shifted toward top quantiles over time at the 




Figure 2: Illustration of the Superstar and Long Tail Effects.  
This is from Elberse and Oberholzer-Gee (2008) who examine both hypotheses on sales data for 
movies, another industry affected by the digital revolution. 
 
 
Hypothesis 2. There is a ‘long-tail’ effect in the market for recorded music today that helps new 
or insurgent artists increase sales at the expense of established or incumbent artists. The long tail hypothesis is 
that sales have become relatively less skewed toward hits and superstars over time. If the 
distribution of recorded music sales has shifted toward bottom quantiles over time at the 
expense of all other quantiles, this hypothesis will be supported (illustrated in both Figures 1 
and 2).  
The superstars hypothesis predicts that demand will become more homogeneous. 
The long tail hypothesis predicts that demand will become more heterogeneous. 
Paradoxically, the same technology change which leads to the leveling of the playing field in 
the long tail thesis could lead to the superstar thesis. Many researchers with relevant data 
believe the popular long tail theory has recently become dogmatic: nothing more than ‘web 




Hypothesis 3. There is some combination of the ‘superstar’ and ‘long-tail’ effects. The hybrid 
hypothesis is a combination of the effects of the above two hypotheses. If the distribution of 
recorded music sales has shifted such that both top and bottom quantiles increase at the 
expense of the middle quantiles, this hypothesis will be supported.  
This hypothesis could also be referred to as the ‘shrinking middle class’ hypothesis. 
Some recent studies have found a distribution becoming skewed toward the tail and the head 
simultaneously while the distribution is tucked towards the origin as absolute sales fall across 
the entire distribution, but relatively more for the middle quantile (Elberse and Oberholzer-
Gee 2008, and Page and Garland 2009). This ‘hit-heavy, skinny tail’ implies greater inequality. 
However, unlike the superstars hypothesis, superstars in this distribution see a shrinking 
absolute share, even though their relative share is increasing. But this is also true of the 
observations in the tail – the ‘underdogs’ – because the tail becomes longer but thinner. 
Evaluation of these hypotheses is of great importance for the future of the music 
industry. The long tail theory itself became a hit among many industry operators and 
observers because it fit many peoples’ world view of increased competition and diversity. 
Some skepticism followed as creative industries continued to see shrinking sales. If there is a 
long tail effect, a leveling of the playing field is occurring, likely benefiting new entrepreneurs. 
If there is a superstar effect, consolidation by the few at the top of the hierarchy is occurring, 
likely benefiting incumbents. As Page and Garland (2009) ask, if indeed the tail of available 
niche products lengthens – a supply side effect – will it then ‘fatten’ with sales – a demand-
side effect? This will depend upon how the demand for recorded music changes in response 
to the digital revolution (Tschmuck 2006). A change in the distribution of revenues from 
incumbents to entrepreneurs would imply increased creative freedom and innovation. On 




heavy losses.  This latter prediction is suggested by Schumpeter’s later work (Schumpeter 
1942, cited in Audretsch 2008). Innovation needs to be funded and large, incumbent firms 
can make the necessary investments. If startup costs are prohibitive to get a new creative act 
up and running, well-capitalized record labels may be necessary. But, both effects could 
cause innovation in business models as artists and firms cooperate or defect in enforcing 
copyrights, or shift to different approaches to making money.  
 To examine these questions, this dissertation quantifies year-end sales in the 
recorded music industry over a five year period from 2004 to 2008. Specifically, a random 
sample of 2,051 artists, 7,010 titles – which are albums, singles and videos – included on 
1,836 labels are observed to see if and to what degree sales distribution profiles are changing 
from year to year. The changes are measured by a variety of techniques also used in other 
studies of this nature. But, no other research has addressed all of the above hypotheses in 
the recorded music industry with such a large sample or in such a recent, relevant time frame.  
 Many retailers have taken Anderson’s long tail theory to heart and implemented it in 
practice. This allows their customers more choice, but also increases costs which make this 
strategy risky if consumers do not support the vast array of niches available. As Will Page, 
chief economist for a copyright collective in the U.K., observes, “now we’ve seen what 
happens when tens of millions of choices are thrown in the air and land on the floor” 
(Orlowski 2008). Shedding light on this debate is significant for the strategies of content 
creators, artists, intermediaries, and retailers. In the old technological paradigm, in the brick-
and-mortar world of rivalness in inventory, there were limits to the products which were 
given shelf space. Those products which were worthy of marketing expenditure were chosen 
very carefully. Content creators, artists, intermediaries, and retailers now must determine 




 This debate applies to globalization as well. Many view technology changes and 
globalization in a positive sense, as with the ‘web utopian’ ideas of Anderson where nascent 
creators flourish. But still others view the same technology changes and globalization in a 
negative sense, predicting that culture will be homogenized. The Internet potentially makes 
culture more uniform in multiple countries as ubiquitous media presence catapults artists to 
the top of the charts on every continent. But there is anecdotal evidence that small, regional 
music scenes can build themselves up by leveraging technology and global markets. This 
upward mobility can be achieved through the cross-cultural exposure that technology and 
globalization allows. One example of this is Kuduro music from Angola. Once a critical 
mass of popularity was reached, aided by the Internet, Kuduro groups began to tour in 
Europe which allowed them to accumulate capital which facilitated further development in 
their home, regional market. So, this is an example of technology and globalization fostering 
















II. History of  the Recorded Music Industry and 
Review of  Empirical Work 
 
 A closer inspection of the evolution of the music industry helps to make sense of the 
institutional changes that are occurring today. This is followed by a discussion of intellectual 
property (IP) rights in the recorded music industry and the associated appropriability regimes 
and appropriability mechanisms that are affected by the institutional changes. Finally, this 
chapter surveys the most relevant literature which has a similar research agenda. This situates 
the context for this study and sheds light on the uniqueness and importance of this research. 
 
A. Evolution of the Recorded Music Industry 
  
First, a brief explanation of contractual arrangements will help to explain the 
structure of the industry referred to throughout this research. The entity of central 
importance, creatively, is the artist or group of musicians referred to as a band. The band 
may write its own music and lyrics or may purchase music and lyrics from an external 
composer (Connolly and Krueger 2006). Other actors play a major role economically and 
legally. Managers or agents represent the band and perform other managerial services for 
which they take a portion of the band’s revenues. Bands make contracts with concert 




called concert organizers, essentially employ the band when they are on tour, advertise the 
concert events, and obtain the venues. If and when an artist or band reaches a certain 
threshold of popularity, they sign a contract with a recording company to produce, market, 
and distribute CDs. Record companies may also promote concerts, though this is becoming 
less prevalent (Krueger 2005). Contractual arrangements between bands and concert 
promoters are varied, though they may be likened to book contracts in that there is an 
advance payment and, if sales exceed a certain level, the band receives royalties. A band 
contracts with a publisher if it composes its own music in order to copyright it. The 
publisher contracts with a performing rights organization (PRO), also referred to as a 
copyright collecting agency or copyright collective. A PRO acts as an intermediary 
facilitating the flow of royalties between copyright holders and licensees. For example, the 
PRO licenses music for radio stations, TV, restaurants, and malls, keeps track of the use of 
music, and collects and distributes royalties. Half of the royalties go to the publisher, the 
other half goes to the composer, and the manager may accrue a small portion of the 
composer’s half. When a band is involved with a record company, it is often a long-term 
contract stipulating the advance, royalty threshold, and royalty rate. The bargaining power is 
in the hands of the record company. The advance to the band, for example, is often used to 
pay expenses which the band must shoulder like recording costs. These contractual 
arrangements and bargaining power have been gradually changing since the new century 
began (Krueger 2005). 
By 2010, revenue streams from live music performance took precedence over 
revenue streams from recorded music. As the decentralization of the music industry 
middlemen and the democratization of music consumption have occurred, the intermediary 




the supply chain. The intermediaries between the consumer and artists, such as record labels, 
collecting societies, copyright collectives, and publishers, are all questionable in their 
relevancy. So, there will likely be winners and losers. External to the Internet, in the non-
digital world, retailers pay royalties to the record label via publishers. Online, in the digital 
world, the retailer pays the record label directly and the record label pays the songwriter, 
publisher, or the Harry Fox Agency. In the former business models, cross-subsidization – 
where a high price charged to one group makes up for a low price charged to another –
occurred because recorded music was still the lucrative revenue stream (Page 2007). Live 
music ticket sales helped to promote record sales. In the new business models, recorded 
music is given away for free and helps to promote concert ticket sales. The cross-
subsidization has deteriorated and possibly reversed. Record labels may increasingly take 
over the job of concert promoter. This kind of arrangement is often referred to as a 360 
degree contract. In exchange for promotion, marketing and other services the label takes a 
percentage of merchandise, concessions and other revenue streams which historically have 
gone to artists. The opposite arrangement is becoming more prevalent as well where the 
concert promoter takes over the job of record label, as seen in the arrangement between 
artists such as Madonna and Shakira and concert promoter Live Nation. In both cases, 
economically the record label has become obsolete in its original capacity.  
 Technological change has always impacted the music industry. In Peter Tschmuck’s 
(2006) analysis, changing conditions of production have an effect on how different actors at 
different parts of the value added chain make money. But, especially in the last 100 years, the 
aesthetic styles which gain popularity in an era are also determined by technological change. 
This is because each institutional change which occurs engenders a change in the logic of 




1920s, the broadcasting industry gained prominence over the publishing and phonographic 
businesses. Along with it came the Jazz Revolution – the corresponding aesthetic style for 
the new conditions of production. The phonographic industry later gained importance again 
in the 1950s. Along with it came the Rock ‘n’ Roll Revolution. The industry has undergone 
dramatic shifts over the past decade because of advances in digital technology. This Digital 
Revolution is still unfolding and the aesthetic style or styles which take precedence will be 
enabled by this technology, particularly computer software.  
The turn of this century brought digitization – the process of transforming goods 
and services from analog to digital form.  Recorded music is no longer in a physical form or 
‘phonogram’.  Most recorded music is now data, where reproduction and distribution costs 
are approaching zero.  MP3 technology has allowed for time and space compression of 
digital music as well as cheap and near-perfect digital copies from CDs. Recorded music can 
be disseminated potentially infinitely through illegal downloading and illegal file sharing. The 
first instances were networks like MP3.com and Napster, both of which began in the late 
1990s.  Unfortunately, from an economic perspective, this ‘piracy’ has compromised the 
private good attributes of rivalness and excludability. Scarcity has given way to abundance 
(Anderson 2006).  Recorded music now approximates a public good where most consumers 
are able to free-ride. This represents, by definition, a market failure.  
Figure 3 demonstrates the decline of the entire recorded music industry since the 
turn of the century in dollar terms. The data in Figures 3, 4, and 5 comes from the 
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), which acts as a copyright collective, 
administers certifications for sales numbers, and sets physical quality standards for 
recordings. The numbers from the RIAA are based on manufacturers’ year-end unit 




dollars. Net returns are accounted for, but the values do not represent sales per se. As 
illustrated in Figure 4, CD shipments have fallen and this is reflected in many brick-and-
mortar retailers going out of business. Figure 4 demonstrates the dollar value of shipments 
of different formats of recorded music. The decline of record stores and floor space for CDs 
at big box media stores can be seen in Figure 5. Figure 5 illustrates the different marketing 
channels that the RIAA tracks. Digital downloads, in Figure 4, and Internet marketing 
channels, in Figure 5, have become more important over time, but are still floundering in 
dollar terms.  
It is difficult for legitimate Internet business models to compete with free MP3s now 
available for file sharing on bit torrent. New forms of legal consumption of MP3s have not 
been very lucrative, and music downloads have often been utilized as a loss leader.  For 
example, iTunes has served this purpose for selling iPods, and Rhapsody has served this 
purpose for Verizon’s mobile phone service.  Before digitization, copyright and the 
enforcement of IP rights constrained consumption, dissemination and production, but also 
creativity (Demers 2006). But from a broader perspective, digitization has brought about 
costs and benefits which are asymmetrically distributed throughout the music industry. 
According to one study, the new appropriability regime has hurt the revenues of the 
successful ‘superstar’ artists more than unknown or new artists (Blackburn 2004).  
There is debate about what will happen to the structure of the industry and the 
distribution of revenues.  Will the existing business models of incumbent firms/artists be 
supplanted by new business models of entrepreneur firms/artists? A survey of history 
reveals that independent – ‘indie’ – artists, indie labels, and indie companies have been an 
entrepreneurial force in the music industry. In the 1920s, the Jazz Revolution was enabled by 


































Figure 3: RIAA’s Total Industry Numbers, 1998-2009.  


















































Figure 4: RIAA’s Numbers Split up by Format, 1998-2008.  































Figure 5: RIAA’s Numbers Split up by Marketing Channel, 1998-2008.  






firms have often taken on the risks of developing new artists and finding new creative styles.  
This is because they have lower costs and can earn a quicker return on units sold than a large 
record company.  Thus, they have a greater ability to ‘roll with the punches’ and adapt to 
changing conditions of production, distribution, and consumption.  Indies can put more 
time investments into developing new acts, due to lower opportunity costs.  Creatively, 
indies are more accurately tuned to their target audience’s demand which facilitates 
entrepreneurship (Tschmuck 2006).  Independent companies, as outsiders, have the ability to 
adapt to new technologies compared with incumbents who may be slow to transform their 
entrenched business models.  Indies also circumvent the constraints that distribution 
monopolies and oligopolies place on creative expression and can therefore find new markets 
more easily.  Leeds (2005) argues that, recently, entrepreneurial indie companies have gained 
market share from the incumbent majors due to technology changes.   
Indeed, the thesis of creative destruction – from the earlier work of Joseph 
Schumpeter – explains that the entrepreneurs who cause creative destruction are 
characteristically small firms outside of the circular flow of existing production activities 
(Schumpeter 1911, cited in Audretsch 2008).  So, the innovation which creates economic 
growth begins with the outsiders. This makes indies a very fitting agent of entrepreneurship 
in the music industry, consistent with Schumpeter’s framework.  What role will independents 
play now?  This will depend upon how the structure of the music industry changes.  A 
change in the distribution of revenues from incumbents to entrepreneurs would imply 
increased creative freedom and innovation.  On the other hand, investment in new talent 
could be dampened due to the incumbent firms’ heavy losses.  Both effects could cause 




 Myopia hurt the incumbent firms because digital technology and the Internet made 
their business models obsolete. The major record companies did not adjust to the changed 
environment they were operating in.  Digital technology, in the form of digital audio tapes 
(DATs), CDs, and MP3s, were all available by the early 1990s. But, by the time the 
technological possibilities all converged with high-speed connections, personal computers, 
the proper software, and the Internet, it was too late for the major labels.  The major 
companies have exhibited a pattern over the last century of ignoring new technology, and 
then once it becomes a threat, fighting the new technology.  This was true in the last century 
with both phonograms and radio broadcasting.  Recently, MP3s and file sharing are the 
harbinger of the end of old business models.  Ironically, this happened right at the apex of 
the incumbent firms’ market success: teen pop, such as NSYNC, exemplified perfection in 
manufacturing blockbusters (Anderson 2006).  At this time much capital was tied up in 
physical infrastructure to manufacture and distribute CDs, which now represents a sunk cost.  
But networks, bolstered by college campus Ethernets, further enabled the availability of free 
music at the turn of the century.   
 Recent changes in the recorded music industry have been devastating to old business 
models. There is potential for the industry to restructure in a decentralized way which fosters 
the relationship between the fan and the band. If artists and bands are free from constraining 
relationships with large companies with distribution monopolies and marketing bottlenecks 
such as terrestrial radio, then artists and bands can create their own rules. According to the 
French indie band Phoenix, there is ‘no one between you and your fans’ and there is more 
possibility for ‘indies to make the pop charts’ in the new paradigm (Phoenix 2010). But the 




the absence of scarcity goes hand-in-hand with the absence of property rights. This 
diminishes the chances for remuneration and may adversely affect the incentives for artists. 
 
B. Technology and the New Property Rights Regime 
 
 The year 2009 marked the one-hundredth anniversary of the Copyright Act of 1909 
which provided the legal basis for the collection of mechanical and performance royalties by 
artists. In 1912, songwriters and publishers created the American Society of Composers, 
Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP) to license performance rights to broadcasting outlets and 
to distribute royalties to members. Performance royalties from radio play and live 
performances were paid to the copyright holders – songwriters and music publishing 
companies. In 1927, the Harry Fox Agency was created to license and collect mechanical 
royalties on phonogram sales for artists and labels. Mechanical royalties were paid to the 
recording artists, with substantial costs deducted. Preceding the digital and Internet 
revolution, the most lucrative revenue streams were from mechanical royalties on recorded 
music. 
Digitization has allowed for circumvention of the IP rights regime, i.e., the copyright 
protection expressed in statutory and legal structures. These IP rights are government-
granted monopolies which provide owners exclusivity in reproduction, performance, and 
derivative use. The combination of mechanisms that secure remuneration from consumers 
by strengthening a private good’s attributes of excludability and rivalness is called an 
‘appropriability regime’. Excludability is the ability to prevent consumer access without 
payment. Rivalry means one consumer’s use prevents another’s use. For example, digital 




rivalness. The new business models which utilize the available technology, like social 
network media, downloading, and streaming services to market recorded music can also be 
considered appropriability mechanisms. By simply not releasing specific albums or parts of 
albums on digital platforms, producers can deliberately create scarcity and excludability. The 
absence of The Beatles’ music on iTunes is an example of a deliberately created scarcity, 
even though the music may be available in other digital formats. Even utilizing a band as a 
brand for differentiation or marketing merchandise is an appropriability mechanism. 
However, the regime is tightened or loosened by the effectiveness of the 
appropriability mechanisms in place. For instance, technological possibilities often outrun 
the legal and statutory structure which protects IP rights. By raising the cost of enforcement 
of IP rights and lowering the cost of violating these rights, digitization has recently loosened 
the appropriability regime. This has decreased remuneration accruing to producers and 
content providers while increasing illegal consumer access to recorded music. Reactions to 
this, such as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), The Performance Rights Act, 
and Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) litigation, are aimed at tightening 
the appropriability regime. Regardless, the loosening effect allows consumers to pay a much 
lower price than under the previous regime, which involved buying physical analog records.  
Digitization brings about costs and benefits which are asymmetrically distributed 
throughout the music industry.  Digitization and the Internet have hurt the revenues of the 
successful superstar artists more than unknown or new artists (e.g. Blackburn, 2004).  This is 
the result of rampant illegal file sharing and downloading which substitutes for higher-priced 
and higher-margin CDs.  Legal downloads have seen increasing importance, but at lower 
margins.  However, it is difficult for any business model to compete with free MP3s.  As 




dissemination of their recordings for free.  On the other hand, this is where unknown or 
new artists benefit.  Free marketing with free MP3 dissemination helps them to overcome 
the hurdle of getting known and expanding their fan base.  But once an artist builds up a fan 
base beyond a certain threshold or network size, it is in their interest to protect their 
recorded music.  Upward mobility and commercialization leads to increased incentives for 
copyright protection.  Some popular artists put much energy into copyright protection and 
enforcement, such as Metallica.  Others posture themselves as disinterested in commercial 
gain, such as Radiohead (Bourdieu 1993).  But the asymmetric costs and benefits, from an 
economic standpoint, remain.   
Mechanical and performance royalty payments are differentially affected.  The focus 
now is on live performances because they are the most lucrative income source. Contracts 
between artists and record companies and between artists and concert promoters are looking 
much different than they were less than a decade ago.  The increased utilization of ‘360 
degree’ contracts means that record companies are getting larger shares of revenue streams 
which formerly went to artists, such as merchandise sales (Leeds 2007).  But this also means 
that, in many cases, record companies are losing viability as phonogram sales and mechanical 
royalties slide relative to performance royalties.   
Retailers have been scrambling to devise new strategies which cater to consumer 
preferences for Internet downloading rather than traditional record store purchases (Demers 
2006).  This is seen in the changing popularity of marketing channels for recorded music, as 
seen in figure 5, and a significant increase in supply and variety.  Online retail has several 
advantages over brick-and-mortar retail.  This is observed in other industries, such as books, 
by comparing the business models of Barnes and Nobel to Amazon.com (e.g. Anderson 




and sellers can reach more customers over the Internet.  Physical shelf space is also not a 
constraint for online retailers, so selection can be much broader due to decreased inventory 
costs.  Inventory is nonrivalrous on the Web, and often there is too much for consumers to 
navigate through.  This problem is remedied by information tools and better filters.  
Algorithm-fueled recommendations, by decreasing transactions costs, help customers find 
titles and create positive sales externalities (Anderson 2006).  The lack of distribution 
bottlenecks allows Rhapsody, a subscription-based MP3 streaming service and retailer, to 
provide customers with back catalog, older albums, live tracks, B-sides, remixes, covers, 
foreign bands, and obscure bands on obscure labels.   
In sum, technological change has transformed institutions in the recorded music 
industry.  The technology change has occurred with the help of personal computers, 
software, and the Internet.  In a pattern relived throughout the past hundred years in this 
industry, technology has changed faster than the legal structure.  This has asymmetric costs 
and benefits for different agents.  The superstar and long tail effects are likely reflections of 
this asymmetry.  Is the pie – total industry revenues – growing?  Is it being sliced differently?  
This analysis is of great importance for the future.  If there is a long tail effect, increased 
diversity and a leveling of the playing field is occurring.  If there continues to be a superstars 
effect, increased homogenization on the few at the top is occurring.  Finally, if innovation is 
still coming from the outsiders – the indies – then new creativity will certainly earn money 








C. Literature Review of Empirical Research 
 
The hypotheses outlined in the first chapter have been empirically examined by 
others studying various industries. Anderson’s long tail thesis is applicable to multiple 
markets. However, prior research has not looked at all three hypotheses together. 
Additionally, other research has not investigated such a recent time frame as the one utilized 
here. Nielsen Soundscan data is not often used due to its proprietary nature. My research is 
timely because it will draw from the methodologies used below to examine the long tail and 
superstars effects in the recorded music industry while there are lively debates occurring in 
industry groups and academic circles. 
Chevalier and Goolsbee (2003) acquire sales and sales rank data for online books 
sellers.  They assume a Pareto distribution, which is more generally an exponential function 




and regress log(rank – 1) on log(sales): 
 
(Rank – 1)/(Total # Titles)=(k/S)θ,  
 
and alternatively expressed: 
 





Assuming a power law distribution, this is a regression of sales rank on sales.  This allows 
estimation of Pareto slope parameters.  I will follow this method to help determine the 
distributional shape of my data.  These authors do not test the hypotheses I will use.  They 
use their parameter estimates to calculate degrees of market power and inflation.   
Elberse and Oberholzer-Gee (2008) test both the superstars and the long tail 
hypothesis.  They collect data for movies from Nielsen VideoScan for sales and sales rank to 
analyze the allocation of revenues across time.  They find a significant change in sales 
distribution over their sample period which shows a ‘flattening’ of the tail, which means a 
larger number of low-volume titles sold, consistent with the Long Tail hypothesis.  
Simultaneously, they discover that ‘superstar’ movies did worse each year over the sample.  
But, contrary to the Long Tail hypothesis, the larger number of low-volume titles were not 
making up for the diminishing sales of high-volume hits.  The variety of supply, or number 
of products, had definitely increased, but there was also a two-fold increase in titles with 
zero sales.  Additionally, there were ever fewer titles at the ‘Head’ (or most-popular) end of 
the Long Tail distribution which meant increased concentration of ‘Superstar’ sales on fewer 
titles.  This is consistent with the Superstars hypothesis to the extent that there is increased 
relative sales in the Head of the distribution – slicing the pie differently – but there is also a 
decrease in the absolute size of sales – decreasing the size of the pie. 
The authors use nonparametric tests to analyze the distribution of revenues across 
titles over the time period of their sample.  They calculate location, scale, skewness, kurtosis 
and create inter-quartile measures to pick up how the ‘Head’ or ‘Tail’ shifted in relation to 
the median.  This allows division of the distribution into different groupings with equal 




more heterogeneous, but also more skewed and asymmetrical: a sharper peak and a longer 
tail.  This supports the hybrid hypothesis. 
Many factors can explain the above changes, and non-parametric results cannot 
control for product characteristics or changes in buyer preferences, so they also estimate 
quantile regression models to test the effect of other business environment changes on the 
sales distributions.  They use this model because the mean is not of interest in this type of 
analysis, but distributional changes are.  Essentially, this is a linear regression with quantile as 
the conditional dependent variable:   
 
Qθ(y│x)=x′β(θ)      
 
Their independent variables are a set of yearly indicators.  The coefficients on these decrease 
for a quantile in the ‘Tail’ of the distribution if there is a Long Tail effect. They find the 
distribution of sales has shifted down in general, but there was also a shift in the mass 
towards niche products.  Besides the Long Tail thesis, explanations like a shorter product life 
cycles could account for declining sales per title in the Head of the distribution.  To test if 
the number of titles reaching certain sales thresholds has changed over time, they also 
estimate a negative binomial regression model.  This method controls for the total number 
of titles available in a given year, which is a potential supply effect explanation.  They find a 
flattening and a lengthening of the Tail.  Quantile regressions show falling sales for 
superstars, and the negative binomial regressions show that this superstar quantile had half 
as many titles as compared to the beginning of the period, consistent with a superstar effect.  




Similarly, Page and Garland (2009) find support for the hybrid hypothesis in legal 
and illegal digital music markets – a combination of the long tail and superstars hypotheses.  
For legal digital music, they find a very long tail, but with 75% of total inventory not selling 
at all.  There is simultaneously a horizontal compacting of the head of the distribution going 
to a shrinking number of hits.   Within the digital music black market – peer to peer (P2P) 
usage data – they find a similar distribution, consistent with the hybrid hypothesis.  P2P has 
a longer tail than the legitimate market.  However, they only analyze their observed 
distribution in a Lorenz curve framework.  This does not consider absolute changes.  The 
pie is sliced differently, and the size of the pie has shrunk for legitimate markets.  But they 
are unable to observe the ‘size of the market’ for P2P.   
Brynjolfsson, Hu, and Smith (2003) also use data on sales and sales rank from an 
online bookseller, Amazon.com, fit to a log-linear distribution:   
 
log(Quantity)= β1+ β2·log(Rank)+ε 
 
A log-linear curve is a Pareto curve.  A Pareto distribution follows a power law.  They 
regress log(Quantity) on a constant term and log(Rank), effectively testing the long tail and 
superstars hypotheses.  This allows estimation of coefficients, ‘Pareto slope parameters’, 
which are found to be negative and significant.  The estimates are used to calculate the 
proportion of unit sales which reside above particular sales ranks relative to the total number 
of available book titles.  They find support for the long tail hypotheses.  From their 
parameter estimates, they calculate consumer surplus gains from online marketing channels. 
Brynjolfsson, Hu, and Simester (2007) use Gini Coefficients and Pareto Curves to 




Again, this is effectively testing the long tail and superstars hypothesis.  They find the Lorenz 
Curve for the Internet channel is less skewed towards the most popular products than for 
the non-Internet channel.  The Gini Coefficient for the Internet channel is lower than the 
catalog channel.  This information gives estimates of percentages of sales generated by 
different percentages of products.  But statistical significance cannot be obtained from these 
estimates.  So, they also find Pareto slope parameters by regressing sales onto sales rank. 
Connolly and Krueger (2006) utilize the same model for concert sales. Brynjolfsson, Hu, and 
Simester (2007) estimate a log-linear relationship:   
 
ln(Sales)= β1+ β2·ln(Sales Rank)+ε 
 
They find the difference between the coefficients of the two marketing channels is 
significant.  They then re-calculate the Lorenz Curve and Gini Coefficient, controlling for 
selection bias.  The Internet channel Lorenz Curve lies above that of the catalog channel, so 
the Internet channel’s Gini coefficient is smaller.  This implies the sales distribution is less 
skewed for the Internet channel relative to the catalog channel.  They then repeat the 
estimation of the sales and sales rank model above with similar results, controlling for 
differences in consumers.  The β1 coefficient is significantly less negative for the Internet 
than for the catalog channel, which implies the sales distribution has a longer tail in the 
Internet channel.  This supports the long tail thesis.  The authors also utilize data from 
individual consumers to determine that when consumers have lower search costs this leads 





 Original observations of stardom came from Irving Fisher and Alfred Marshall 
(Fisher 1925, Marshall 1947, cited in Hamlen 1994). As average income increases, the 
demand for high-quality goods and services rises faster than the demand for low-quality 
goods and services. Improved technology decreases production costs and lowers output 
prices, which allows higher-quality products to consolidate market share. In Marshall’s time, 
this did not apply to music to the degree it did for Rosen (1981). For Rosen, skewness in 
earnings was the result of differences in talent and imperfect substitutability. Subsequent 
research attempted to test how this might come about. McDonald (1988) extended Rosen’s 
analysis into a dynamic information accumulation process of popularity.  
 There are differing ways to define popularity or success. Popularity within a genre 
and various chart measurements are used. Chung and Cox (1994) use number of Gold 
Records. Because Rosen’s specific formulation of the hypothesis relies on talent differences, 
talent is defined in different ways. Hamlen (1991), for example, uses an objective measure of 
voice quality to proxy for talent. Krueger 2005 uses the volume of articles written about 
particular artists. 
Factors other than talent could lead to a superstar effect. The social nature of music, 
for instance, may lead to a ‘snowball effect’, or increasing returns to success, where a highly 
skewed sales distribution could emerge regardless of talent. Artists with equal talent could 
experience vastly different sales levels due to unique properties of consumer demand for 
recorded music. Adler (1985) argues that consumers minimize search costs. Music 
consumption requires knowledge and consumers can only accumulate a limited amount 
through discussion. They therefore specialize in certain artists or genres to minimize costs. 
Similarly, Crain and Tollison (2002) argue that consumers economize on accumulating the 




music, which leads to a superstar effect. Hamlen (1991) contradicted Rosen’s analysis by 
showing that increases in his ‘objective’ measurement of talent – harmonic content – show 
sales increasing at a decreasing rate. Consumers could, theoretically, recognize talent – 
singing quality – but increases in talent lead to less than proportional increases in record sales. 
Decreasing returns to ability is the opposite of what Rosen suggested. Chung and Cox (1994) 
show how a superstar distribution, through specific kinds of random probability mechanisms, 
could arise regardless of talent. However, Giles (2006) uses the same method with different 
data and finds slightly different distributions. This lends some credence to Rosen’s original 
idea. Different methods are used by Spierdijk and Voorneveld (2007) to test different 
probability mechanisms. Though different stochastic processes are tested out, all of these 




These examinations of the superstar phenomenon have some problems. Any 
‘objective’ measurement of quality, talent, or ability is problematic because any conclusions 
are too sensitive to the scale chosen. Even though Rosen relies on differences in talent for 
his explanation, it is futile to define it. For example, independent, ‘indie’, fans have different 
definitions of what ‘indie talent’ is and what legitimate locations to see indie concerts are. 
Progenitors of different styles of music, genres, and sub-genres utilize numerous different 
cultural symbols and have numerous sources for legitimation and consecration which are 
unlikely to be agreed upon. There are combinations of factors which lead to the distribution 
profiles which are observed. Certainly, random factors do play an important role in which 




consumption are important; but the talent, ability, and productivity of the artists/bands play 
an important role as well. Investment in marketing strategies and promotion are a huge 
factor in who gets exposure, radio airplay, and visibility to mass audiences. It is a confluence 
of these effects which produce superstardom.  
It is unnecessary to attempt to define an objective measure of talent. For example, 
talent is multidimensional (e.g. Crain and Tollison. 2002) and inter-genre comparisons of 
talent are problematic. It is also problematic to model consumer behavior in relation to 
cultural goods. First of all, the data used in this study does not observe consumer attributes. 
Beyond this, consumption and production of cultural goods involves competition for 
symbolic distinctions and symbolic profits (Bourdieu 1984, 1993). Because it is symbolic, it is 
difficult to define commensurate scales of comparison. This cannot be modeled by utility 
maximization or cost minimization as many researchers have done.   
A shift in supply has been brought about by technological and institutional change. 
This is altering the structure of the industry and eroding property rights. Consequently, for 
this research the sales distribution is examined across the sample period to test if sales 
concentration has increased or decreased.  
Therefore, this study incorporates the methodologies of the studies outlined above 
which simply analyze outcomes. The presence of changes in the sales distribution profile is 
evidence enough to accept or reject the superstar, long tail, and hybrid hypotheses as they 
are defined here. This does not require arbitrary and questionable assumptions about 
objective quality, or consumer behavior in cultural markets. Though the data utilized for this 
research is the most accurate unit sales information in the recorded music industry, the data 






III. Data Collection and Data Description 
 
This chapter summarizes the data collection process and describes the resulting data 
set. The first section analyzes the procedure of creating the data set and the problems 
encountered in that process. There is also a description of the specific formats that are 
tracked. In the second section, graphs and descriptive statistics are used to shed light on the 
basic patterns that can be observed in the data set.  
 
A. Nielsen Soundscan and Data Collection Procedure 
 
The data for this study comes from Nielsen Soundscan. Nielsen Soundscan collects 
point-of-sale transaction data on unit sales from over 14,000 retailers across the U.S. It 
comes from retail, mass merchant and non-traditional distribution channels (on-line stores, 
venues, mail order, and digital services). Big retail chains, such as Wal-Mart, Tower Records, 
Virgin Megastores, and Sam Goody – now For Your Entertainment (F.Y.E.) – report to 
Soundcan. The sales information collected by Nielsen is used by most music industry 
operators and has been used to create the Billboard music charts since 1991. They provide 
academic access packages as well.  
The necessary information for my research from the Nielsen system, pulled from 




upgrade that July. But, the available time frame begins in week 1 of 2004 and goes through 
week 52 of 2009. My focus is on a random sample of artists available during this time frame. 
Because of truncation, the random sample covers 2004 through 2008. This is due to data 
problems which did not allow time to complete the retrieval of all 2009 sales information for 
previously-gathered (prior to 2009) and newly-released 2009 artists and titles as this year-end 
information became available. Consequently, to make the sample size as large as possible, all 
2009 sales were removed and we focus only on five years, 2004 through 2008.  
Artists were chosen randomly by a random letter generator and random number 
generator. The sample, then, does exclude artists and bands whose name begins with 
numbers. An English letter and subsequent page number were both chosen from a discrete 
uniform distribution and the associated page corresponding to that letter-number 
combination was located. As time went on, the number of pages (from which to draw a 
random number) for any letter of the alphabet changed as new titles were released by artist 
names beginning with that letter further up in the alphabetical list. So, this required the 
number to be updated depending on the number of titles available. A search query in 
Nielsen Soundscan’s title search for a given letter brings up a specific number of pages (for 
certain letters, thousands) of results in a search query. Specifically, my ‘title lookup’ selection 
criterion was search for: ‘letter’, search by: ‘artist’, options: ‘match from beginning’, and 
format: ‘album/single/video’. Nielsen Soundscan lists artists alphabetically and each 
webpage presents 100 ‘titles’ for those artists. Individual ‘titles’ correspond to the names of 
albums, singles, and videos. Sales histories for ‘digital tracks’, as opposed to what I refer to as 
‘unbundled tracks’, are organized differently in the system compared to 
albums/singles/videos because they have their own products codes independent of the 




Nielsen was limited. Digital tracks, however, would be interesting to examine in future 
research projects. 
More specifically, after a random letter was chosen a random page number was 
chosen, depending on how many pages of 100 titles showed up on that date. Nielsen’s 
search results list all titles belonging to alphabetically-listed artists ranging anywhere from 
one to 100 artists per page. This depends on how many titles were currently available for sale 
by those particular artists. My sample includes all titles available for all artists listed on a 
particular randomly-chosen page. So, if a particular artist’s list of titles spilled over onto 
another page or pages, all of those titles were also included.  
Individual ‘artists’ are defined by Nielsen Soundscan. An ‘artist’ could be an artist’s 
stage name, an artist’s real name, a band name, an orchestra conductor’s name, a compilation 
of different conductors together, a movie soundtrack, a record label sampler, or other 
collaborations such as a movie or documentary for which copyright holders have an interest 
in tracking. There are many observed errors presumably committed in the process of 
retailers reporting information to Soundscan. I omit some artists who should not belong in 
the sample and correct misspellings. Some artists release titles with a band as well as solo. If 
the solo artist’s name or stage name was listed on the page randomly chosen, this became 
part of the sample. But any other artist-band collaboration the artists might be involved with 
was omitted if it was not listed on the page. The reason for this is that an artist and band 
collaboration includes other creative inputs from other artists. It is the combination of 
inputs, i.e. defined by Nielsen’s listed ‘artist’, which were randomly chosen and so belong in 
the random sample. So in general, an individual artist could be an individual artist’s name or 
stage name with or without any collaboration by another artist, conductor, band, or bands. 




example, if an artist showed up on the randomly chosen page, but a release recorded by this 
artist and her band showed up on another page, only the solo artist is included. However, in 
many cases, the retailer reporting sales to Soundscan misspelled an artist’s name, stage name, 
or band. The misspellings provide another layer of randomness to the sample. This is 
because a misspelled name would be listed on a randomly chosen page when the artist would 
not have been included in the sample if not for the misspelled name. To amend misspelling 
issues, I searched for the correct artist name and all of the common incorrect spellings of 
that name. At Nielsen’s recommendation, I included unit sales information for both 
correctly and incorrectly spelled artist names and bands and listed them under the proper 
nomenclature, if it could be tracked down. For example, the stated proper listing for an 








WU-TANG KILLA BEES 









Even if the name was listed incorrectly, and as long as the proper nomenclature was found, 
all artists were included with all different listings, correct or incorrect. For example, entries 












In this case, the correct entry would be CASH*JOHNNY. However, these would be listed 
on different pages because search results were listed in alphabetical order. 
I used the Chart and Sales History title reports because they displayed year-to-date 
(YTD) and release-to-date (RTD) unit sales broken into each sales format for each week. 
The broad format characterizations are albums, singles, or videos. These are then divided 
into YTD total units and YTD digital units. RTD total units information for album releases 
also includes more specific formats:  
1) LPs. ‘Long-playing record’ albums are 33⅓ revolution per minute (rpm) 
analog phonograph records, usually having a diameter of 10 or 12 inches. 
Since 1948, this was the chief format for phonograms until the advent of the 
compact disc (CD). The phonograms can be made of vinyl (polyvinyl 
chloride) or not. ‘Long playing’ refers to the relative time capacity. 
2) Cassette tapes. Also called audio cassettes, these contain an analog audio 
signal written on plastic magnetic tape spun around two spools. 
3) CDs. A compact disc stores digital audio data, but is still a phonogram, in 
physical form. 
4) Digital video discs (DVD). These contain a digital signal. DVDs are often 





5) Digital albums. This is an album of individual cuts or tracks bundled and 
sold together via an online retail platform such as iTunes, Amazon, 
Rhapsody, etc. Sometimes individual tracks can be sold and downloaded 
separately or unbundled. These are categorized differently. ‘Digital tracks’ 
have their own serial number and are categorized differently than digital 
albums and unbundled tracks, but are not included in this sample. 
Singles are shorter than albums with one or more tracks. Songs on a single can also come 
out on an album. Singles often contain a song or songs which are the most popular song or 
songs from an album and therefore serve a promotional purpose. RTD total units for single 
releases specifically includes:  
1) CDs.  
2) 12-inch singles (12”). The 12-inch single analog-signal phonograph record is 
made from acetate and emerged from the disco era, circa 1970. These were 
originally smaller (10”) but are usually now the same diameter as an LP, but 
with rpm of 45 and other characteristics which improve sound quality, 
particularly the base frequencies. 
3) Cassette tapes. 
4) Digital singles. This is a single of individual cuts or tracks bundled and sold 
together via an online retail platform such as iTunes, Amazon, Rhapsody, etc. 
5) Maxi CDs. This is also referred to as a ‘maxi single’, and sometimes 
abbreviated ‘MCD’. It is a music single release with more than two tracks in 
CD form. The origin is the same as the 12-inch single but at first it included 
more tracks. 




1) UMDs. A ‘Universal Media Disc’ is an optical disc medium made for the 
Sony PlayStation Portable which is a handheld video game system.  
2) DVDs.  
3) Video tapes. These contain an analog video signal written on plastic 
magnetic tape spun around one or two spools. 
YTD and RTD unbundled tracks are also tallied for both albums and singles. Consumers 
often have the option from many online MP3 retailers to purchase one or more individual 
tracks unbundled from the ‘single’ unit or ‘album’ unit. 
The first pages that were used included information from week 52 of 2004, 2005, 
2006, 2007, and 2008 for each individual title. Any artist names (described above) which in 
my best judgment were misspelled or could be commonly misspelled were individually 
searched in the Nielsen system to find as many misspellings as possible. All of the unit sales 
information for alternative spellings of those artists was included as well as newly discovered 
misspellings. Chronologically, week 52 2009 information was not available until the end of 
our Nielsen access window. The previous week’s data is available the following Wednesday. 
The first time around, I kept a record of the starting point, all of the artists and titles saved, 
and the ending point of the random page’s location in the alphabetical listing of artists, so 
that I could find it again. This is because I anticipated the position of the artists and titles on 
the page I originally visited would change over time as new 2009 titles were released further 
up the alphabetical list as time went on. After downloading the latest information, I had to 
check once again for misspellings for the new artists which were picked up. Bounce Software 
LLC put the final html files together into excel form. The final excel file data needed further 
revision due to various issues. Many catalog numbers were duplicated for different releases 




Additionally, many titles had changing characteristics over time. For example, record label 
names sometimes changed from year to year due to mergers and other ownership changes. 
Artist and title names were sometimes spelled differently from year to year. Listed release 
dates also changed as time went on. This is likely due to reporting errors in Nielsen’s system. 
Again, any fixes related to these issues were performed manually. 
All together, this study utilizes a random sample of 7,010 albums, singles, and videos 
released by 2,051 different artists and 1,836 different labels to study the distribution of unit 
sales in the U.S. music industry from 2004 to 2008. The detailed level of the formats 
included here is important because of the technology changes that have been occurring over 
the last few years and shifting consumer preferences.  
When a yearly sales figure of zero is observed for a given artist’s title, it is not known 
whether this title is available for sale or not. All that is known is that at some point in the 
past, the title was registered with Nielsen Soundscan. A band, for example, could have 
broken up years ago. This is important because the number of titles and artists with yearly 
sales of zero doubles from 2004 to 2008. So certain analyses below are done for two groups. 
The first group is non-conditional sales, which includes the zeros. The second group is 
conditional sales, which drops the zeros. So ‘conditional sales’ for the second group is 
conditional on sales being greater than zero, or nonzero. 
There is likely some degree of sampling bias due to the sampling methodology. 
Given the constraints present in the Nielsen Soundscan system, no sampling methodology 
could have made artist or title selection random with a uniform probability. Characteristics 
of the population were not known, or withheld by Nielsen. Using RIAA figures, the best 
estimation of the percentage of total industry unit sales that are present in this sample is 




volume of data in the system and the restrictions on search queries compounded this. 
Consequently, artists with larger numbers of titles are over-represented because they are 
present on more pages and more likely to show up on any given page of 100 titles. Artists 
with smaller numbers of titles are then under-represented. This suggests that the sample may 
be biased towards superstars because the number of titles is correlated with higher unit sales. 
Even if more information was known about the population from Nielsen and unique artists 
could be pulled, the spelling problems outlined above may still have created bias and made a 
random sample difficult to achieve. Artists who were spelled incorrectly are over-represented 
because their titles span more pages in the system and are more likely to be picked up. 
Additionally, the sample is biased towards artists who have been around longer because they 
have released more titles and product life cycles for each individual title have more time to 
work themselves out. Because superstars have longer product life cycles, the sample is once 
again biased towards them. 
 
B. Description of the Data 
 
Figure 6 displays all unit sales, bundled digital sales, and unbundled track sales from 
2004 to 2008 for the sample used for this study. Non-digital sales are also shown, which is all 
sales minus digital sales. A detailed description of each format discussed in this research is 







Table 1: Summary of Recorded Music Formats. 
Album Releases: Single Releases: Video Releases: 
CDs or compact discs store 
digital audio data, but is still 
a phonogram, in physical 
form. 
CDs (explained in left 
column) 
UMDs or ‘Universal Media 
Discs’ are optical disc 
mediums made for the Sony 
PlayStation Portable which is 
a handheld video game 
system.  
LPs or ‘Long-playing 
record’ albums are 
33⅓ revolution per minute 
(rpm) analog phonograph 
records, usually having a 
diameter of 10 or 12 inches.  
12 Inch Singles (12”) are 
analog-signal phonograph 
records made from acetate 
which emerged from the 
disco era, circa 1970.  
DVDs (explained in left 
column) 
Cassette Tapes are also 
called audio cassettes, these 
contain an analog audio 
signal written on plastic 
magnetic tape spun around 
two spools. 
Cassette Tapes (explained 
in left column) 
Video Tapes contain an 
analog video signal written 
on plastic magnetic tape 
spun around one or two 
spools. 
DVDs or digital video discs 
contain a digital signal. 
DVDs are often bundled 
together with CDs. This 
form of bundling is not 
reported by Nielsen. 
Maxi CDs or ‘maxi singles’ 
or ‘MCD’ are music single 
releases with more than two 
tracks in CD form.  
 
Digital Albums are albums 
of individual cuts or tracks 
bundled and sold together 
via an online retail platform 
such as iTunes, Amazon, 
Rhapsody, etc. Sometimes 
individual tracks can be sold 
and downloaded separately 
or unbundled. These are 
categorized differently.  
Digital Singles are singles 
of individual cuts or tracks 
bundled and sold together 
the same way as a digital 
album. Sometimes individual 





All unit sales rise from about 5 million in 2004 to peak at 7 million in 2006. From there, all 
unit sales decline to about 3 million – its lowest value – by 2008. The rise in digital unit sales 
increases consistently across this time frame from 43,000 in 2004 to 380,000 in 2008. 




sales in 2004 and 14% of CD sales in 2008. So, digital albums do not compensate for the 
sharp decline in physical CD albums. But at the same time, unbundled track sales rise 
drastically from 3 million to 43 million. This exemplifies the increased consumer preference 
for individual songs over the album as a unit. This is facilitated by the record label and 
retailer strategy of mixed bundling (Elberse 2009). Figures 7 and 8 confirm the above trends 
with sales per artist and sales per title. The same patterns are observed when sales are divided 
by the number of artists and number of titles, respectively. However, average unbundled 
track sales do decline for both artists and titles in 2008. This decline is a symptom of the 
crowding of the market due to lower barriers to entry catching up to sales numbers. The 
supply of artists and bands has increased and so has competition. 
The release dates for the titles in the sample are described in Table 2 for all albums, 
singles, and videos. The average release year is 2002. The median release year is 2004 which 
is the first year of the sample. The earliest release year is 1957 and the standard deviation is 
5.5. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Release Dates and Release 
Years.  
Mean, median, standard deviation (in years), minimum and maximum. 
  Mean Median SD Min  Max 
  37458.6368 38053 5.52836264 20821 39812 
Release 
Date 7/21/2002 3/7/2004 5.52836264 1/1/1957 12/30/2008 
Release 

































Figure 6: Total Unit Sales Each Year: All Units, Tracks, Digital, and Non-Digital, 2004-2008.  
For each year of the sample period. Included are all unit sales, unbundled digital track sales, bundled digital units sales (i.e. digital albums or singles), 























Average Unbundled Track Sales
Average Bundled Digital Sales
 
Figure 7: Average Unit Sales for Artists: All Units, Tracks, and Digital, 2004-2008.  


























Average Unbundled Track Sales
Average Bundled Digital Sales
 
Figure 8: Average Unit Sales for Titles: All Units, Tracks, and Digital, 2004-2008.  





Table 3 presents some descriptive statistics for the different formats being analyzed. 
The general categorizations are albums, singles, and videos. There are 7,010 titles total, of 
which 6,349 are albums, 310 are singles, and 351 are videos. These are further broken down 
into more specific formats. The absolute numbers in the first column indicate how many 
titles sold greater than zero units of the specific format listed. The percentages listed indicate 
the fraction of the total. It is the same for albums, singles and videos. The list of specific 
formats is not mutually exclusive, i.e. does not add up to 100%. The percentages listed mean 
the proportion of the total titles that sold greater than 1 unit as that specific format. So, for 
albums, about 71% of the 6,349 albums sold greater than one CDs. About 38% of all albums 
sold bundled and unbundled digital units. But for singles, there were more unbundled tracks 
sold than entire bundled single units, i.e. 24% and 15% respectively. LPs, DVDs, Maxi CDs, 
12 inch singles, video tapes, and UMDs are relatively insignificant. However, 34% of the 
singles sold at least one 12 inch single and 30% of singles sold at least one Maxi CD – 
greater than both CDs and audio cassettes. For videos, DVDs are more popular than video 
tapes. However, in this five year period from 2004 to 2008, over 25% of the videos did sell 
at least one video tape. 
Figure 9 compares unit sales for the more popular formats: digital, CDs, and DVDs 
from 2005 to 2008. Figure 10 compares unit sales for the less popular formats: LPs, cassettes, 
Maxi CDs, 12 inch singles, video tapes, and UMDs. Although bundled digital unit sales 
numbers are available in 2004, the remainder of the formats are only available starting in 
2005. For these formats, in order to find year-to-date (YTD) sales, release-to-date (RTD) 
sales for year t are subtracted from year t+1 RTD sales. Because the first year available is 
2004, 2003 RTD figures are not available, and 2004 YTD numbers cannot be computed for 







Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Albums, Singles, and Videos: Sales Shares of Specific Formats.   
All titles are either albums, singles, or videos. Albums can be sold as LPs, cassettes, CDs, DVDs, and bundled digital form. Singles can be sold as 
cassettes, CDs, Maxi CDs, and 12 Inch singles. Videos can be sold as DVDs, video tapes, and UMDs. 
 




Looking at Figure 9, DVD sales peak in 2006 but then bottom out by 2008. This follows the 
pattern of overall unit sales in Figure 1. CD sales do the same, but the yearly changes are 
much more pronounced. Starting from 5.4 million in 2005 and peaking at nearly 7 million in 
2006, CD sales settle to a new low by 2008 at 2.6 million. Bundled digital album sales rise 
consistently over the years, but are relatively small in volume. Figure 10 tracks the less 
popular formats over time. Perhaps not surprisingly given consumer technology trends, 
audio cassette sales plummet from 2005 to 2008. Another implication from Figure 10 is that 
LP sales are a niche market on the rise: increasing 107% from 2005 to 2008
 































Figure 9: Unit Sales for the More Popular Formats: Digital, CDs, DVDs, 2005-2008.  
Bundled digital albums and singles, CDs, and DVDs from 2005 through 2008. 
 
 






Unit Sales for the Less Popular Formats: LPs, Cassettes, Maxi 























Figure 10: Unit Sales for the Less Popular Formats: LPs, Cassettes, Maxi CDs, 12 Inch, Video 
Tapes, UMDs, 2005-2008.  




IV.  Empirical Results 
 
This chapter examines the data in three steps. First, relative shifts in the distribution 
are evaluated. Relative shifts are expressed in terms of percentages, fractions, or ratios 
without units. This is done by comparing the relative sales shares for different quantiles 
across time and by comparing Gini coefficients across time. Second, absolute shifts in the 
sales distribution are examined. Absolute shifts are expressed in terms of sales levels with 
units. This is done by comparing changes in the level of sales for several summary statistics 
across time. Third, simple regressions are performed which determine if there are differences 
in the slope of the sales distribution between years and if these differences are statistically 
significant.  
 
A. Relative Sales Changes: Is the Pie Sliced Differently? 
 
In this section, the distribution of sales is investigated for artists, titles, and labels for 
each year of the sample by comparing changes in the proportion of the total sales captured 
by different percentiles of artists, titles, and labels respectively. To start, relative changes in 
the distribution of sales are analyzed by quantile. Subsequently, Gini coefficients are 
compared in the same manner. 
Following the analysis of Elberse and Oberholzer-Gee (2008), Table 4 shows sales 




sample. This shows, for all formats taken together, the percentage of total sales received by 
each decile of artists, as well as by each percentile above the 90th. These numbers imply that 
the market becomes more concentrated from 2004 to 2006. This is because each quantile of 
artists shown from the 60th on up to the 99th account for a smaller percentage of total sales 
from 2004 to 2006. The top 1% of artists increases until 2006 and is the driver this change. 
More concentration, in a relative sense, implies the tail of the distribution gets less. This 
suggests a superstar effect. However, later on the market becomes less concentrated. From 
2006 to 2008 for artists there is less concentration because these same quantiles account for 
an increasing percentage of total sales. Less concentration implies the tail of the distribution 
gets more. This suggests a long tail effect. Specifically, in 2004, 95% of artists account for 
2.65% of total sales. This drops to 1.08% by 2006, but rises again to nearly 2% in 2008. In 
2004, 99% of artists account for 17.65% of total sales. This dips to a low of 7.35% in 2006, 
but rises again to 12.62% by 2008. Figures 11, 12, and 13 illustrate this distributional pattern 
for artists by graphing the percentage of total sales captured by each quantile listed for each 
year. This depicts the increasing and then decreasing trend in relative concentration. 
Table 5 also shows the percentage of total sales received by each quantile of artist – 
which is the percent cumulative frequency of unit sales by artist – juxtaposed with the 
cumulative frequency of unit sales by artist. This is done for ease of comparison. The 
cumulative frequency is calculated by summing unit sales ‘so far’ up to a given percentile of 
artists. This can be considered the cumulative distribution function (CDF). The percent 
cumulative frequency is calculated by dividing the cumulative frequency at the given 






Table 4: The Percent of Total Sales Accruing to Different 
Quantiles of Artists, 2004-2008.  
Specifically, this shows the 1st through 9th decile, and then 91st through 99th percentile of artists. For 
example, the bottom 95% of artists account for 2.64% of sales in 2004, but the bottom 95% of artists 
account for 1.40% of sales in 2007, and so on. 
  % sales 
All 
Formats       
            
  N=1172 N=1336 N=1575 N=1795 N=2051 
% 
artists 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
10 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 
20 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 
30 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 
40 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0003% 0.0003% 0.0004% 
50 0.0028% 0.0025% 0.0032% 0.0050% 0.0005% 
60 0.0119% 0.0102% 0.0105% 0.0165% 0.0257% 
70 0.0404% 0.0331% 0.0300% 0.0459% 0.0693% 
80 0.1620% 0.1119% 0.0879% 0.1283% 0.1807% 
90 0.8631% 0.5586% 0.3778% 0.4958% 0.6919% 
91 1.0540% 0.6916% 0.4509% 0.5913% 0.8237% 
92 1.2678% 0.8498% 0.5385% 0.7192% 1.0033% 
93 1.5954% 1.0709% 0.6650% 0.8793% 1.2239% 
94 2.0274% 1.3823% 0.8280% 1.1018% 1.5393% 
95 2.6468% 1.8380% 1.0749% 1.4057% 1.9449% 
96 3.7797% 2.6744% 1.4625% 1.8441% 2.6160% 
97 5.9164% 3.9328% 2.1797% 2.7226% 3.8100% 
98 10.7007% 6.2677% 3.5702% 5.0546% 6.2428% 
99 17.6450% 11.5334% 7.3497% 10.9743% 12.6179% 








































% Cumulative Frequencies for Artists, 4th-9th Deciles
 
 
Figure 11: Percent Cumulative Frequencies – Percent of Total Sales Accruing to 4th through 9th 












































% Cumulative Frequencies for Artists, 91st-99th Percentiles
 
 
Figure 12: Percent Cumulative Frequencies – Percent of Total Sales Accruing to 91st through 






























% Cumulative Frequencies for Artists, 97th-100th Percentiles
 
 
Figure 13: Percent Cumulative Frequencies – Percent of Total Sales Accruing to 97th through 








Table 5: Cumulative Frequencies and % Cumulative Frequencies for Artists, 2004-2008.  
As with Table 4, this table also shows the percent of total sales accruing to different quantiles of artists, which is the % cumulative frequency of unit sales. 









































Cumulative Frequencies for Artists, 4th-9th Deciles
 
 














































Cumulative Frequencies for Artists, 91st-99th Percentiles
 
 

























Cumulative Frequencies for Artists, 97th-100th Percentiles
 
 






Table 6 also displays sales distributions by quantile, but for individual titles. Table 6 
lists the percentage of total sales received by each decile of titles, as well as each percentile 
above the 90th, again, for all formats. Titles exhibit a similar pattern as albums with increasing 
concentration from 2004 through 2006 and decreasing concentration from 2006 through 
2008. Specifically, in 2004, 95% of titles account for 11.255% of total sales. This drops to 
5.51% by 2006, but rises again to nearly 7.2% in 2008. In 2004, 99% of artists account for 
41% of total sales. This dips to a low of 25% in 2006, but rises to 30% by 2008. The top 1% 
of titles is the driver of these changes in relative shares. Figures 17, 18, and 19 illustrate this 
distributional pattern for titles. Again, there seems to be a superstar effect from 2004 
through 2006 and a long tail effect from 2006 through 2008.  
Table 7 also shows the percentage of total sales received by each quantile of title – 
which is the percent cumulative frequency of unit sales by title – along with the cumulative 
frequency of unit sales by title. This is done for ease of comparison of the CDF with the 



















Table 6: The Percent of Total Sales Accruing to Different 
Quantiles of Titles, 2004-2008.  








 percentile of titles. 
  % sales 
All 
Formats       
            
  N=3882 N=4468 N=5201 N=6088 N=7010 
% 
titles 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
10 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 
20 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 
30 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 
40 0.0025% 0.0005% 0.0004% 0.0000% 0.0000% 
50 0.0201% 0.0121% 0.0100% 0.0090% 0.0144% 
60 0.0791% 0.0521% 0.0417% 0.0441% 0.0648% 
70 0.2576% 0.1760% 0.1357% 0.1534% 0.2158% 
80 0.8794% 0.6150% 0.4538% 0.5074% 0.6872% 
90 4.1325% 2.8391% 1.9366% 2.2060% 2.7330% 
91 4.9975% 3.4378% 2.3379% 2.6875% 3.2231% 
92 6.0387% 4.2001% 2.8611% 3.2963% 3.8625% 
93 7.3461% 5.1506% 3.5185% 4.0931% 4.6680% 
94 9.0086% 6.4371% 4.3644% 5.1777% 5.7135% 
95 11.2480% 8.1419% 5.5126% 6.6698% 7.1970% 
96 14.3714% 10.4874% 7.2230% 8.7483% 9.3140% 
97 18.8880% 13.8398% 10.0046% 11.8003% 12.4021% 
98 26.1212% 19.0523% 14.6091% 17.3723% 18.0411% 
99 40.9483% 29.4064% 24.9872% 28.8969% 29.8275% 











































% Cumulative Frequencies for Titles, 4th-9th Deciles
 
 
Figure 17: Percent Cumulative Frequencies – Percent of Total Sales Accruing to 4th through 9th 













































% Cumulative Frequencies for Titles, 91st-99th Percentiles
 
 
Figure 18: Percent Cumulative Frequencies – Percent of Total Sales Accruing to 91st through 
































% Cumulative Frequencies for Titles, 97th-100th Percentiles
 
 
Figure 19: Percent Cumulative Frequencies – Percent of Total Sales Accruing to 97th through 









Table 7: Cumulative Frequencies and % Cumulative Frequencies for Titles, 2004-2008.  
As with Table 6, this table also shows the percent of total sales accruing to different quantiles of titles, which is the % cumulative frequency of unit sales. 











































Cumulative Frequencies for Titles, 4th-9th Deciles
 
 















































Cumulative Frequencies for Titles, 91st-99th Percentiles
 
 





























Cumulative Frequencies for Titles, 97th-100th Percentiles
 
 









Labels show a similar pattern as artists and titles. This can be seen in Table 8 and 
Figures 23, 24, and 25. The 91st through 99th percentiles, however, do not see the same 
‘rebound’ in sales share in the final two years – 2007 and 2008 – as artists and titles do. The 
top 1% of labels retain their share of relative sales, so there is a much smaller long tail effect 
in those last two years judging by the concentration of relative sales by label compared to 
artists and titles. 
Once more, Table 9 also shows the percentage of total sales received by each 
quantile of label – which is the percent cumulative frequency of unit sales by label – 
compared with the cumulative frequency of unit sales by label. This is done for ease of 
comparison of the CDF with the percent cumulative frequency. These figures are arrived at 























Table 8: The Percent of Total Sales Accruing to Different 
Quantiles of Labels, 2004-2008.  








 percentile of labels. 
  % sales 
All 
Formats       
            
  N=1104 N=1286 N=1468 N=1643 N=1836 
% 
labels 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
10 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 
20 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 
30 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 
40 0.0024% 0.0012% 0.0012% 0.0019% 0.0034% 
50 0.0111% 0.0081% 0.0075% 0.0091% 0.0155% 
60 0.0374% 0.0268% 0.0255% 0.0308% 0.0498% 
70 0.1249% 0.0824% 0.0722% 0.0922% 0.1461% 
80 0.3895% 0.2575% 0.2022% 0.2780% 0.4311% 
90 1.8659% 1.1275% 0.8021% 1.0505% 1.5374% 
91 2.2824% 1.4062% 0.9799% 1.2601% 1.8401% 
92 2.8616% 1.8358% 1.2251% 1.5751% 2.2301% 
93 3.6981% 2.4219% 1.5651% 2.0016% 2.7465% 
94 5.0049% 3.3372% 2.1542% 2.6403% 3.4718% 
95 7.0933% 4.5987% 3.0464% 3.6507% 4.4454% 
96 10.2252% 6.4880% 4.3319% 5.3878% 5.9159% 
97 14.3748% 9.1767% 6.8735% 8.3861% 8.3038% 
98 19.9591% 14.0426% 11.8891% 13.7415% 13.2370% 
99 32.2171% 23.8760% 21.5944% 24.5173% 24.1479% 








































% Cumulative Frequencies for Labels, 4th-9th Deciles
 
 
Figure 23: Percent Cumulative Frequencies – Percent of Total Sales Accruing to 4th through 9th 









































% Cumulative Frequencies for Labels, 91st-99th Percentiles
 
 
Figure 24: Percent Cumulative Frequencies – Percent of Total Sales Accruing to 91st through 
































% Cumulative Frequencies for Labels, 97th-100th Percentiles
 
 
Figure 25: Percent Cumulative Frequencies – Percent of Total Sales Accruing to 97th through 











Table 9: Cumulative Frequencies and % Cumulative Frequencies for Labels, 2004-2008.  
As with Table 8, this table also shows the percent of total sales accruing to different quantiles of labels, which is the % cumulative frequency of unit sales. 











































Cumulative Frequencies for Labels, 4th-9th Deciles
 



















































Cumulative Frequencies for Labels, 91st-99th Percentiles
 



























Cumulative Frequencies for Labels, 97th-100th Percentiles
 






Another way to compare relative shifts in industry concentration over time is with 
Gini coefficients. A Gini coefficient has values between zero and one and measures the 
degree of consolidation of a variable across individuals contributing to it. It compares the 
Lorenz curve of an ordinally-ranked distribution with the line of perfect equality, which is 
the 45 degree line. Specifically, the area in between the Lorenz curve and the 45 degree line 
is divided by the entire area under the 45 degree line and Lorenz curve combined. The 
Lorenz curve is a graph of the cumulative share or distribution function of rank-ordered 
observations. A higher Gini coefficient implies a higher concentration of the distribution. 
For example, a Gini coefficient of unity implies one individual sells 100% of the total sales 
while the remainder of individuals sell 0%. A lower Gini coefficient implies a lower 
concentration in the distribution of sales. For example, a Gini coefficient of 0 implies that 
each individual has equal sales, each individual contributes equally to total sales, and the 
Lorenz curve is superimposed upon the 45 degree line. The Gini coefficient results are 
displayed in Figure 17 for artists, Figure 18 for titles, and Figure 19 for labels. All Gini 
coefficients are in the upper nineties which implies an extremely high concentration of sales. 
As with the analysis above, there is a trend of rising inequality and then declining inequality 
across the five year time span. But for Gini coefficients, the peak concentration years range 
from 2005 to 2007. Many of these year-to-year changes for this measure are quite small 






















Figure 29: Gini Coefficients for Artists, 2004-2008.  

























Figure 30: Gini Coefficients for Titles, 2004-2008.  
























Figure 31: Gini Coefficients for Labels, 2004-2008.  




Figures 20, 21, and 22 show the same Gini coefficient calculations but with zero 
sales dropped. A similar pattern is observed, however the decreasing concentration observed 
above in the later years is much less pronounced. In all three figures, there is rising inequality 
and then a leveling out in which consolidation of sales remains about the same or declines 
only slightly in the final year or two. So when only non-zero sales are taken into account, 
there is a superstar effect for the first three years – 2004, 2005, and 2006 – for albums, titles, 
and labels. Then, in 2007 and 2008, there is a slight decline in concentration. All of the Gini 
coefficients for artists, titles, and labels end up higher at the end of the five year period. This 
is a clear superstar effect, regardless of the slight decline in concentration observed in the 




































Figure 32: Gini Coefficients for Artists, Non-zero Sales Only, 2004-2008.  



























Figure 33: Gini Coefficients for Titles, Non-zero Sales Only, 2004-2008.  
































Figure 34: Gini Coefficients for Labels, Non-zero Sales Only, 2004-2008.  





B. Absolute Sales Changes 
 
This section looks at absolute changes by analyzing the location, scale, skewness, 
kurtosis, and inter-quartile measures from year to year. This illuminates the distributional 
shapes and, for example, how tails shift relative to the median. In this section, quantile is 
abbreviated with a Q, such that Q.75 is the 75
th percentile or 3rd quartile. Q.50 stands for the 
median or 2nd quartile. Table 7 shows absolute distributional changes from year to year 
across artists. For albums, singles, and videos together, the number of artists with zero yearly 
sales increases every year. For all formats, this number trends up from 477 artists in 2004 to 
806 artists by 2008. The percentage of artists who sell one or more units, i.e. the percentage 
of artists that have non-zero sales, remains fairly constant at around 60%. For all formats, 
the number of artists reaching sales levels above the 50th percentile of unit sales increases 
steadily from 573 artists in 2004 to 947 in 2008. The number of artists with sales levels above 
the 90th percentile rises consistently from 117 in 2004 to 204 in 2008. The number of artists 









Table 10: Absolute Distributional Changes for Artists: The Distribution Described in Sales 
Units, 2004-2008.  
Across years for all formats. This shows how many sales were equal to zero, greater than zero, greater than the median (Q.50), 3rd quartile (Q.75), 90th 





Table 8 displays the same absolute changes in the distribution of sales across titles. 
For all formats together, the number of titles with zero yearly sales increases each year. This 
number rises from 1,423 titles in 2004 to 3,033 titles in 2008. The percentage of titles which 
sell one or more units declines slightly. In 2004, over 63% of titles have non-zero sales while 
in 2008 it is about 57%. Across all formats, the number of titles with sales levels above the 
50th percentile increases from 1,922 in 2004 to 2,918 in 2008. The number of titles with sales 
levels above the 90th percentile nearly doubles from 388 in 2004 to 700 in 2008. The number 










Table 11: Absolute Distributional Changes for Titles: The Distribution Described in Sales Units, 
2004-2008.  
Across years for all formats. This shows how many sales were equal to zero, greater than zero, greater than the median (Q.50), 3rd quartile (Q.75), 90th 





Summary statistics for the sales distributions for artists are revealed in Table 9. The 
location of the median (Q.50) and scale, (Q.75-Q.25)/(Q.75+Q.25), remain the same for each year. 
Scale remains the same because the 25th percentile is 0. The measure of skewness, (Q.75+Q.25-
2Q.5)/(Q.75-Q.25), is positive and declines, i.e. becomes less skewed, steadily over time from 
0.91 in 2004 to 0.75 in 2008. This means that the sales distribution becomes less 
concentrated which implies the long tail effect. Similarly, kurtosis, (Q.9-Q.1)/(Q.75-Q.25), 
generally declines over time from 15.75 in 2004 to 11.06 in 2007 with a slight rise again in 
2008 to 11.75. A decline in kurtosis implies a more rounded peak and shorter, thinner tail for 
the distribution. These numbers provide evidence that the distribution of artist sales 
becomes less asymmetric and less concentrated.  However, the decline in kurtosis means the 
sales distribution becomes less spread out. The inter-quartile measure (Q.75-Q.25), i.e. the 
difference between the 3rd and 1st quartiles, decreases consistently each year from 45.5 in 
2004 to 16 in 2008. This implies that the middle class of artists is shrinking, which supports 
the hybrid hypothesis. The left tail inter-quartile measure (Q.50-Q.25)/Q.5) remains constant at 
1. This is consistent with a long, flat tail. The right tail inter-quartile measure (Q.75-Q.50)/Q.50) 
declines each year starting from 21.75 in 2004 and ending at 7 in 2008. This also implies that 










Table 12: Summary Statistics for Artists: Location, Scale, Skewness, Kurtosis, Inter-quartile, 
Left Tail, Right Tail, 2004-2008.  





Table 10 lists summary statistics for the sales distributions for titles. The location of 
the median, (Q.50), declines from 4 in 2004 to 1 in 2007. Scale, (Q.75-Q.25)/(Q.75+Q.25), 
remains the same for each year. Scale remains the same because the 25th percentile is 0. 
Skewness, (Q.75+Q.25-2Q.5)/(Q.75-Q.25), is positive and basically remains the same at around 
0.9. Kurtosis, (Q.9-Q.1)/(Q.75-Q.25), does not show any obvious trend. The inter-quartile 
measure (Q.75-Q.25) decreases consistently each year from 75 in 2004 to 20 in 2008. This 
supports the hybrid hypothesis because sales are declining for the middle class. The left tail 
inter-quartile measure remains constant at 1. This suggests a long, flat tail. The right tail 











Table 13: Summary Statistics for Titles: Location, Scale, Skewness, Kurtosis, Inter-quartile, Left 
Tail, Right Tail, 2004-2008.  






C. Regression Analysis 
 
There is much evidence that the sales distributions are changing from year to year. 
The next step is to test the statistical significance of these differences. In this section, unit 
sales are regressed on sales rank in the following log-linear form for annual sales: 
 
ln(Sales+1)= β0+ β1·ln(Sales Rank)+ε   
 
‘Sales’ are the total unit sales for each year from 2004 to 2008. ‘Sales Rank’ represents artists 
or titles ordinally ranked by the sum of their yearly unit sales. Sales is regressed on sales rank 
for artists as well as titles for total unit sales, digital unit sales, non-digital, and unbundled 
track sales. The coefficients on Sales Rank are then compared between years. Subsequently, 
the same regressions are performed with zero sales dropped. Firstly, β0 can be considered a 
measure of overall sales in a given year. Secondly, β1 can be considered a magnitude of how 
rapidly the share of yearly sales drops off as sales rank increases. The long tail hypothesis 
implies that β1 will decrease in absolute value over time due to the institutional and 
technological changes as consumers diversify consumption as more variety is made available 
to them. So, the slope with which sales drops off will be less steep or become less negative 
over time. The intuition is that less popular artists will gain a larger share of sales over time. 
It is the same analogy for regressions with titles instead of artists.  
 The superstar hypothesis would be just the opposite effect, with an absolute value of 




The same institutional and technological changes on the supply side allows consumers not 
only to ‘ride down the long tail’ to seek out unique, niche, and less popular content but also 
buy more of what the superstars have available because superstars can reach larger audiences 
than they could before the institutional constraints and bottlenecks were lifted. Tables 11, 12, 
13, and 14 describe the data to be regressed aggregated across artists and titles from 2004 to 
2008.  
 Because both variables are in log form, β1 represents an elasticity. These elasticities 
will be negative because as sales rank increases for an artist, they are moving down the list 
with lower sales. As rank increases, sales decline. The β1 then can be referred to as a rank 
elasticity of sales or the elasticity of sales with respect to rank.  
 Table 11 lists the number of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum and 
maximum for sales aggregated across artists. The number of artists captured in the sample 
rises from 1,172 in 2004 to 2,051 in 2008. The formats are broken into total unit sales, digital 
























Table 14: Synopsis of Artist Sales: Number of Observations, 
Mean, Standard Deviation, Minimum, Maximum. 
Variable Obs Mean     Std. Dev.       Min Max 
YTD Total Unit 
Sales 2008 
2051    1594.255    28492.13          0 1182376 
YTD Digital Unit 
Sales 2008 
2051    186.256    2038.171          0 62122 
YTD Non-Digital 
Unit Sales 2008 
2051    1407.999    26726.05          0 1120254 
YTD Track Sales 
2008 
2051    20936.99      382450 0 1.36e+07 
YTD Total Unit 
Sales 2007 
1795 2437.085    46239.81          0 1822934 
YTD Digital Unit 
Sales 2007 
1795 200.0401    2375.612          0 68663 
 
YTD Non-Digital 
Unit Sales 2007 
1795 2237.045    44158.74          0 1754271 
 
YTD Track Sales 
2007 
1795 22250.67    490889.2          0 1.93e+07 
YTD Total Unit 
Sales 2006 
1575 4684.949    129048.2          0 5092834 
YTD Digital Unit 
Sales 2006 
1575 174.7733    3101.211          0 113096 
YTD Non-Digital 
Unit Sales 2006 
1575 4510.175    126115.8          0 4979738 
YTD Track Sales 
2006 
1575 13547.8    241802.3          0 7259474 
YTD Total Unit 
Sales 2005 
1336 4274.117    80487.39          0 2826446 
YTD Digital Unit 
Sales 2005 
1336 113.9401    1789.257         -1 48433 
YTD Non-Digital 
Unit Sales 2005 
1336    4160.177    79134.11          0 2785806 
 
YTD Track Sales 
2005 
1336    6286.979    103021.9          0 3175213 
YTD Total Unit 
Sales 2004 
1172 4297.239    58436.92          0 1766603 
YTD Digital Unit 
Sales 2004 
1172    36.65614    424.3298          0 11877 
YTD Non-Digital 
Unit Sales 2004 
1172    4260.583    58027.55          0 1754726 
YTD Track Sales 
2004 
1172    2505.443     31339.8          0 760239 
 
 Table 12 lists the number of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum and 
maximum for sales aggregated across artists, but with artists who sell zero dropped. The 




Table 15: Synopsis of Non-zero Artist Sales: Number of 
Observations, Mean, Standard Deviation, Minimum, Maximum. 
Variable Obs Mean     Std. Dev.        Min Max 
YTD Total Unit 
Sales 2008 
1245    2626.359    36538.52          1 1182376 
YTD Digital Unit 
Sales 2008 
793    481.7289    3257.299          1 62122 
YTD Non-Digital 
Unit Sales 2008 
1020    2831.182    37854.22          1 1120254 
YTD Track Sales 
2008 
831    51674.81    599728.4         1 1.36e+07 
YTD Total Unit 
Sales 2007 
1088 4020.742    59349.89          1 1822934 
YTD Digital Unit 
Sales 2007 
643 558.4323    3945.857          1 68663 
YTD Non-Digital 
Unit Sales 2007 
927 4331.71    61390.29          1 1754271 
YTD Track Sales 
2007 
729 54787.31    769440.9          1 1.93e+07 
YTD Total Unit 
Sales 2006 
970    7607.004    164404.5          1 5092834 
YTD Digital Unit 
Sales 2006 
484    568.7355    5578.263          1 113096 
YTD Non-Digital 
Unit Sales 2006 
872    8146.245    169448.9          1 4979738 
YTD Track Sales 
2006 
578    36916.57    398286.1          1 7259474 
YTD Total Unit 
Sales 2005 
790    7228.127    104593.8          1 2826446 
YTD Digital Unit 
Sales 2005 
277    549.5487    3904.481          1 48433 
YTD Non-Digital 
Unit Sales 2005 
752    7390.952    105394.4          1 2785806 
YTD Track Sales 
2005 
390    21536.93    189986.8          1 3175213 
YTD Total Unit 
Sales 2004 
695    7246.567    75766.62          1 1766603 
YTD Digital Unit 
Sales 2004 
158 271.9051    1130.748          1 11877 
YTD Non-Digital 
Unit Sales 2004 
682    7321.705    75944.39          1 1754726 
YTD Track Sales 
2004 
205     14323.8    73944.65 1     760239 
   
 
 
 Table 13 lists the number of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum and 
maximum for sales aggregated across titles. The number of individual titles included in the 
sample rises from 3,877 in 2004 to 7,010 in 2008. Once again, the formats are broken into 







Table 16: Synopsis of Title Sales: Number of Observations,  
Mean, Standard Deviation, Minimum, Maximum. 
  
 Table 14 lists the number of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum and 
maximum for sales aggregated across titles, but with titles which sell zero dropped. As with 
Variable Obs Mean     Std. Dev.        Min Max 
YTD Total Unit 
Sales 2008 
7010        466.4504    4968.971         -9 233615 
YTD Digital Unit 
Sales 2008 
7010        54.49515    520.1796          0 15738 
YTD Non-Digital 
Unit Sales 2008 
7010        411.9552    4654.102         -9 222817 
YTD Track Sales 
2008 
7010        6125.788    61534.43          0 1955003 
YTD Total Unit 
Sales 2007 
6087    718.6737    8572.936         -1 411073 
YTD Digital Unit 
Sales 2007 
6087    58.98998    668.4988          0 31223 
YTD Non-Digital 
Unit Sales 2007                
6087    659.5754    8079.362         -3 395100 
YTD Track Sales 
2007 
6087    6561.516    113033.3          0 6885512 
YTD Total Unit 
Sales 2006 
5199    1419.272    23855.05          0 1430885 
YTD Digital Unit 
Sales 2006 
5199    52.94634    721.0653          0 35509 
YTD Non-Digital 
Unit Sales 2006 
5199      1365.8    23518.49          0 1429360 
YTD Track Sales 
2006 
5199    4104.208    55564.72          0 2453507 
YTD Total Unit 
Sales 2005 
4465    1278.885    15969.11          0 778298 
YTD Digital Unit 
Sales 2005 
4465    34.09272    604.1053         -1 34429 
YTD Non-Digital 
Unit Sales 2005 
4465    1243.956     15615.6    0 773583 
YTD Track Sales 
2005 
4465    1881.166    13149.16          0 313567 
YTD Total Unit 
Sales 2004 
3877    1299.036    11058.91          0 380157 
YTD Digital Unit 
Sales 2004 
3877    11.08099    119.3603          0 3788 
YTD Non-Digital 
Unit Sales 2004 
3877    1286.296    10955.81          0 376369 
YTD Track Sales 
2004 




Table 12 for artists, the number of titles captured in the sample with non-zero sales is 
variable. 
Table 17: Synopsis of Non-Zero Title Sales: Number of 
Observations, Mean, Standard Deviation, Minimum, Maximum. 
 
Variable Obs Mean     Std. Dev.        Min Max 
YTD Total 
Unit Sales 2008 
3976    822.3908    6575.982          1 233615 
YTD Digital 
Unit Sales 2008 




3186    906.4077     6871.59          1 222817 
YTD Track 
Sales 2008 
2319    18517.37    105923.3       1 1955003 
YTD Total 
Unit Sales 2007 
3439    1272.047    11375.34          1 411073 
YTD Digital 
Unit Sales 2007 




2902      1383.7     11660.3          1 395100 
YTD Track 
Sales 2007 
1956     20419.2    198722.9          1 6885512 
YTD Total 
Unit Sales 2006 
3151    2341.731    30608.56          1 1430885 
YTD Digital 
Unit Sales 2006 




2804    2533.354    31986.93          1 1429360 
YTD Track 
Sales 2006 
1513    14102.96    102337.6          1 2453507 
YTD Total 
Unit Sales 2005 
2708    2108.648    20464.12          1 778298 
YTD Digital 
Unit Sales 2005 




2537    2190.775    20674.76          1 773583 
YTD Track 
Sales 2005 
1071    7842.581    25971.86          1 313567 
YTD Total 
Unit Sales 2004 
2454    2052.308    13845.56          1 380157 
YTD Digital 
Unit Sales 2004 




2395    2084.928    13889.52          1 376369 
YTD Track 
Sales 2004 





Regression results for artists are displayed in Table 15. The β1s for each year are then 
graphed for ease of comparison in Figure 23. To interpret these coefficients economically, 
recall that they represent elasticities. If β1 increases over time – decreases in absolute value – 
then sales become less elastic with respect to rank over time. For example, a 1% increase 
(decrease) in sales rank causes a decline (rise) in the average artist’s sales of 2.83% in 2004, 
and a decline (rise) in sales of 2.34% in 2008. All coefficients are statistically different from 
zero, p<0.01, and all R2s are high. β1 increases, or decreases in absolute value, for artists from 
2004 through 2008 for all unit sales and non-digital sales. This implies a long tail effect: less 
concentration of sales over time. However, the β1 for digital units and for tracks declines, or 
increases in absolute value, each year from 2004 to 2008. This implies a superstar effect: less 






















Table 18: Regression Results for Artists, 2004-2008.  
All unit sales, bundled digital sales, unbundled track sales, and non-digital sales. One asterisk (*) 
indicates significance at 5% and two (**) significance at 1%. 
 Artists, All Unit Sales    
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
β0 19.477740 18.762840 18.168920 17.529170 17.399350 
Std. 
Err. 0.094356 0.076053 0.057714 0.047481 0.044571 
β1 -2.831656** -2.683175** -2.531821** -2.406398** -2.344046** 
Std. 
Err. 0.015343 0.012112 0.008960 0.007226 0.006650 
R
2
 0.966800 0.973500 0.980700 0.984100 0.983800 
 Artists, Bundled Digital Sales   
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
β0 6.972735 9.433881 11.332410 12.480830 13.344460 
Std. 
Err. 0.125508 0.115027 0.087198 0.075980 0.068072 
β1 -1.082853** -1.421365** -1.646286** -1.769906** -1.848238** 
Std. 
Err. 0.020408 0.018321 0.013537 0.011564 0.010157 
R
2
 0.706400 0.818700 0.903900 0.928900 0.941700 
 Artists, Unbundled Track Sales   
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
β0 12.862030 16.351370 18.267020 19.259580 19.811540 
Std. 
Err. 0.185478 0.137456 0.108006 0.092543 0.090689 
β1 -1.981948** -2.429178** -2.622732** -2.700930** -2.730577** 
Std. 
Err. 0.030159 0.021891 0.016768 0.014085 0.013532 
R
2
 0.786800 0.902300 0.939600 0.953500 0.952100 
 Artists, Non-Digital Sales   
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
β0 19.42923 18.58049 17.79645 16.78220 16.20026 
Std. 
Err. 0.09547 0.07770 0.06307 0.05824 0.05547 
β1 -2.82986** -2.66738** -2.50383** -2.33471** -2.21849** 
Std. 
Err. 0.01552 0.01237 0.00979 0.00886 0.00828 
R
2
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Figure 35: Coefficients on Sales Rank for Artists, 2004-2008.  




For artists, the tests for statistically significant differences between the β1s between 
each pair of consecutive years are shown in Table 15. These are all highly significant, p<0.01. 




Table 19: Test of Significance Between Years for Artists.  
Results for the test of significance for the coefficient on sales rank (β1) between each pair of 
consecutive years for artists. 
 Artists, All Unit Sales   
 2005-2004 2006-2005 2007-2006 2008-2007 
chi2(  1)  130.28 157.62 172.47 168.57 
Prob > chi2  0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
 Artists, Bundled Digital Sales  
 2005-2004 2006-2005 2007-2006 2008-2007 
chi2(  1)  246.43 156.42 168.33 70.48 
Prob > chi2  0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
 Artists, Unbundled Track Sales  
 2005-2004 2006-2005 2007-2006 2008-2007 
chi2(  1)  154.95 142.11 84.81 25.11 
Prob > chi2  0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
 Artists, Non-Digital Sales  
 2005-2004 2006-2005 2007-2006 2008-2007 
chi2(  1)  137.16 165.77 221.24 505.85 
Prob > chi2  0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
 
Regression results for titles are displayed in Table 16. The β1s for each year are 
shown in Figure 24. All coefficients are statistically different from zero, p<0.01, and all R2s 
are high. β1 increases, or decreases in absolute value, for titles from 2004 through 2008 for all 
unit sales and non-digital sales. This implies a long tail effect: less concentration of sales over 
time. However, the β1 on digital units and tracks declines, or increases in absolute value each 
year. This implies a superstar effect: more concentration of sales over time for these formats 








Table 20: Regression Results for Titles, 2004-2008.  
All unit sales, bundled digital sales, unbundled track sales, and non-digital sales. One asterisk (*) 
indicates significance at 5% and two (**) significance at 1%. 
 Titles, All Unit Sales    
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
β0 22.340320 21.841250 21.688680 20.493980 19.774060 
Std. Err. 0.083884 0.070414 0.058319 0.048897 0.042992 
β1 -2.727106** -2.637747** -2.577229** -2.408078** -2.284445** 
Std. Err. 0.011441 0.009424 0.007651 0.006286 0.005429 
R
2
 0.936200 0.946100 0.956200 0.960200 0.961900 
 Titles, Bundled Digital Sales   
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
β0 6.936466 9.465947 11.487680 12.515120 13.183700 
Std. Err. 0.069629 0.067104 0.059696 0.054345 0.049074 
β1 -0.908565** -1.208017** -1.427520** -1.520678** -1.569924** 
Std. Err. 0.009497 0.008981 0.007832 0.006986 0.006197 
R
2
 0.702600 0.802200 0.864700 0.886200 0.901600 
 Titles, Unbundled Track Sales   
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
β0 16.361080 20.106040 22.145970 23.380800 24.233630 
Std. Err. 0.140612 0.121996 0.104764 0.092178 0.087964 
β1 -2.122573** -2.538734** -2.728928** -2.817669** -2.869431** 
Std. Err. 0.019178 0.016328 0.013744 0.011850 0.011108 
R
2
 0.759700 0.844200 0.883500 0.902800 0.905000 
 Titles, Non-Digital Sales   
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
β0 22.33288 21.71379 21.36902 19.71512 18.62412 
Std. Err. 0.08396 0.07054 0.05935 0.05321 0.04711 
β1 -2.73357** -2.63770** -2.56475** -2.34554** -2.18466** 
Std. Err. 0.01145 0.00944 0.00779 0.00684 0.00595 
R
2
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Figure 36: Coefficients on Sales Rank for Titles, 2004-2008. 




For titles, the test for statistically significant differences between the β1s between 
each pair of consecutive years are shown in Table 17. These are all highly significant, p<0.01. 
So, the differences in concentration implied by the coefficients on sales rank each year are 
significant. 
 
Table 21: Test of Significance Between Years for Titles.  
Results for the test of significance for the coefficient on sales rank (β1) between each pair of 
consecutive years for titles. 
 Titles, All Unit Sales   
 2005-2004 2006-2005 2007-2006 2008-2007 
chi2(  1)  118.66 99.19 1033.95 992.25 
Prob > chi2  0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
 Titles, Bundled Digital Sales  
 2005-2004 2006-2005 2007-2006 2008-2007 
chi2(  1)  1034.05 2744.91 3945.67 155.65 
Prob > chi2  0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
 Titles, Unbundled Track Sales  
 2005-2004 2006-2005 2007-2006 2008-2007 
chi2(  1)  583.05 431.76 227.27 157.39 
Prob > chi2  0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
 Titles, Non-Digital Sales  
 2005-2004 2006-2005 2007-2006 2008-2007 
chi2(  1)  123.38 118.33 1017.94 1198.96 
Prob > chi2  0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
 
For artists, the story for the regressions performed with only non-zero sales is similar. 
The results are listed in Table 18 and the coefficients on sales rank are graphed in Figure 25. 
All coefficients are statistically different from zero, p<0.01 and all R2s are high. For all unit 
sales and non-digital sales, β1 increases, or decreases in absolute value, each year for artists. 
This implies a long tail effect, but the year-to-year differences here are far less pronounced 
than above. This can be seen in Figure 25. Likewise, for digital units and tracks, the 
superstars trend is much less obvious. For artists the β1 on ln(Sales Rank) does not change 







Table 22: Regression Results for Non-Zero Artists, 2004-2008.  
Regression results for artists with only non-zero sales: all unit sales, bundled digital sales, unbundled 
track sales, and non-digital sales. One asterisk (*) indicates significance at 5% and two (**) 
significance at 1%. 
 Artists, All Unit Sales    
Non-Zero Sales Only 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
β0 19.67917 19.22728 18.64886 18.24244 18.08056 
Std. Err. 0.14922 0.12332 0.09318 0.07696 0.07239 
β1 -2.87862** -2.78440** -2.63498** -2.55351** -2.48198** 
Std. Err. 0.02648 0.02140 0.01562 0.01266 0.01166 
R
2
 0.94460 0.95550 0.96710 0.97400 0.97330 
 Artists, Bundled Digital Sales    
Non-Zero Sales Only 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
β0 12.34504 13.60712 14.28978 15.08215 15.42584 
Std. Err. 0.20338 0.15477 0.10522 0.08575 0.08930 
β1 -2.34946** -2.33243** -2.26225** -2.29619** -2.25552** 
Std. Err. 0.04852 0.03268 0.01992 0.01542 0.01549 
R
2
 0.93760 0.94880 0.96400 0.97190 0.96400 
 Artists, Non-Digital Sales    
Non-Zero Sales Only 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
β0 19.69318 19.14236 18.65203 18.15277 17.73801 
Std. Err. 0.15206 0.12513 0.09900 0.08087 0.06988 
β1 -2.88943** -2.78719** -2.68022** -2.60904** -2.51903** 
Std. Err. 0.02707 0.02190 0.01690 0.01366 0.01162 
R
2
 0.94370 0.95570 0.96660 0.97530 0.97880 
 Artists, Unbundled Track Sales   
Non-Zero Sales Only 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
β0 18.49341 19.13396 19.93960 20.50949 21.38744 
Std. Err. 0.25916 0.16426 0.13104 0.10924 0.11020 
β1 -3.18883** -2.97902** -2.93691** -2.92860** -3.01669** 
Std. Err. 0.05832 0.03240 0.02402 0.01922 0.01896 
R
2

























Artists, All Unit Sales
Artists, Bundled Digital Sales
Artists, Unbundled Track Sales
Artists, Non-Digital Sales
 
Figure 37: Coefficients on Sales Rank for Non-Zero Artists, 2004-2008.  
Coefficients on sales rank for artists with only non-zero sales for all unit sales, bundled digital albums and singles, unbundled digital track sales, and non-





 For artists with non-zero sales only, the tests for statistically significant differences 
between the β1s between each pair of consecutive years are shown in Table 19. For all unit 
sales and non-digital sales, these are all highly significant, p<0.01. For bundled digital sales, 
the year-to-year differences are insignificant for 2004-2005, are significant at 5% for 2005-
2006 and 2006-2007, and significant at 1% for 2007-2008. For unbundled track sales, the 
difference is significant at the 1% level from 2004-2005, insignificant in between and then 
significant at the 1% level again from 2007-2008. The same implications from the above 
regressions with sales of zero included still stand for all unit sales and non-digital sales when 
the zeros are removed from the regression: a significant long tail effect. For the two digital 
formats considered, the superstar effect is non-existent when only non-zero sales are 
considered in the regression.   
 
Table 23: Test of Significance Between Years for Non- 
Zero Artists.  
Results for the test of significance for the coefficient on sales rank (β1) between each pair of 
consecutive years for artists with non-zero sales. 
 
 Artists, All Unit Sales   
Non-Zero Sales Only 2005-2004 2006-2005 2007-2006 2008-2007 
chi2(  1)  27.22 56.59 41.53 109.66 
Prob > chi2  0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
 Artists, Bundled Digital Sales  
Non-Zero Sales Only 2005-2004 2006-2005 2007-2006 2008-2007 
chi2(  1)  0.08 4.43 4.94 18.1 
Prob > chi2  0.77610 0.03540 0.02630 0.00000 
 Artists, Non-Digital Sales   
Non-Zero Sales Only 2005-2004 2006-2005 2007-2006 2008-2007 
chi2(  1)  33.75 35.24 30.73 154.9 
Prob > chi2  0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
 Artists, Unbundled Track Sales  
Non-Zero Sales Only 2005-2004 2006-2005 2007-2006 2008-2007 
chi2(  1)  6.99 1.38 0.15 40.03 






For titles, the story for the regressions performed with only non-zero sales is similar. 
The results are listed in Table 20. All coefficients are statistically different from zero, p<0.01 
and all R2s are high. For titles, the β1 for all unit sales increases, or decreases in absolute value, 
each year. This implies a long tail effect, but the year-to-year differences are far smaller, as 
graphed in Figure 26. For digital units, the superstars trend is much dampened but still 
visible. For tracks, the superstars trend is present. Non-digital sales show no obvious trend. 
Again, the coefficients change much less from year to year, and trends are less prominent 


























Table 24: Regression Results for Non-Zero Titles, 2004-2008.  
Regression results for titles with only non-zero sales: all unit sales, bundled digital sales, unbundled 
track sales, and non-digital sales. One asterisk (*) indicates significance at 5% and two (**) 
significance at 1%. 
 Titles, All Unit Sales    
Non-Zero Sales Only 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
β0 21.47061 21.35977 21.48776 20.82042 20.12763 
Std. Err. 0.11963 0.10765 0.09162 0.08235 0.07340 
β1 -2.58633** -2.56329** -2.55014** -2.46444** -2.34493** 
Std. Err. 0.01739 0.01543 0.01286 0.01142 0.00998 
R
2
 0.90020 0.91070 0.92590 0.93130 0.93290 
 Titles, Bundled Digital Sales    
Non-Zero Sales Only 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
β0 11.90182 13.57606 14.70792 15.38134 15.68703 
Std. Err. 0.14887 0.11632 0.10281 0.08810 0.08300 
β1 -1.80366** -1.90947** -1.95696** -1.97685** -1.95991** 
Std. Err. 0.02839 0.02012 0.01652 0.01359 0.01235 
R
2
 0.89690 0.91810 0.91760 0.92810 0.92360 
 Titles, Non-Digital Sales    
Non-Zero Sales Only 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
β0 21.52278 21.40234 21.63546 21.00180 20.14196 
Std. Err. 0.12286 0.11269 0.09992 0.09279 0.08144 
β1 -2.60200** -2.58902** -2.60989** -2.55109** -2.42254** 
Std. Err. 0.01792 0.01630 0.01425 0.01317 0.01141 
R
2
 0.89800 0.90870 0.92290 0.92820 0.93400 
 
Titles, Unbundled Track 
Sales    
Non-Zero Sales Only 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
β0 19.66380 22.53804 24.03926 24.99087 25.89233 
Std. Err. 0.32401 0.23665 0.18482 0.15333 0.14941 
β1 -2.54870** -2.87007** -2.98624** -3.03299** -3.09079** 
Std. Err. 0.05857 0.03904 0.02887 0.02304 0.02190 
R
2



























Titles, All Unit Sales
Titles, Bundled Digital Sales
Titles, Unbundled Track Sales
Titles, Non-Digital Sales
 
Figure 38: Coefficients on Sales Rank for Non-Zero Titles, 2004-2008.  
Coefficients on sales rank for titles with only non-zero sales for all unit sales, bundled digital albums and singles, unbundled digital track sales, and non-




Considering titles with only non-zero sales, the test for statistically significant 
differences between the β1s between each pair of consecutive years are shown in Table 21. 
For all unit sales, 2004-2005 is significant at 5%, but then insignificant from 2005-2006 until 
significant again at 1% from 2006-2007 and 2007-2008. For bundled digital sales, the year-
to-year differences are significant at 1% for 2004-2005 and 2005-2006, then significant at the 
5% level for 2006-2007 and 2007-2008. For non-digital sales, 2004-2005 is insignificant, but 
the following three pairs of years are significant at the 1% level. For unbundled track sales, 
all pairs of years are significant at the 1% level aside from 2006-2007. The same implications 
from the above regressions are relevant here for all unit sales and non-digital sales when the 
zeros are removed from the regression: a long tail effect, but much less consistent. For the 
two digital formats considered, the superstar effect is visible and statistically significant when 
only non-zero sales are considered in the regression.   
 
 
Table 25: Test of Significance Between Years for Non- Zero 
Titles.  
Results for the test of significance for the coefficient on sales rank (β1) between each pair of 
consecutive years for titles with non-zero sales. 
 Titles, All Unit Sales   
Non-Zero Sales Only 2005-2004 2006-2005 2007-2006 2008-2007 
chi2(  1)  6.4 2.29 347.69 323.63 
Prob > chi2  0.01140 0.13010 0.00000 0.00000 
 Titles, Bundled Digital Sales  
Non-Zero Sales Only 2005-2004 2006-2005 2007-2006 2008-2007 
chi2(  1)  11.4 9.53 3.94 4.34 
Prob > chi2  0.00070 0.00200 0.04720 0.03710 
 Titles, Non-Digital Sales   
Non-Zero Sales Only 2005-2004 2006-2005 2007-2006 2008-2007 
chi2(  1)  3.17 9.92 351.45 384.37 
Prob > chi2  0.07520 0.00160 0.00000 0.00000 
 Titles, Unbundled Track Sales  
Non-Zero Sales Only 2005-2004 2006-2005 2007-2006 2008-2007 
chi2(  1)  44.11 10.47 4.81 24.89 





So, a superstar effect is evident in the digital formats: bundled digital albums and 
singles and unbundled tracks for both artists and titles. Consider this the ‘digital superstar 
effect’. A long tail effect is evident in overall unit sales and non-digital sales for both artists 
and titles. Consider this the ‘non-digital long tail effect’. However, when only non-zero sales 
are considered these trends are not as conspicuous, though they are still present. For non-
zero sales only, there is asymmetry between artists and titles. For non-zero artist sales, the 
digital superstar effect is diluted while the non-digital long tail effect is still there. For non-
zero title sales, the non-digital long tail effect is diluted while the digital superstar effect is 
still present. The conclusions gleaned from this chapter’s data analysis are summarized in 
Table 23. 
 
D. Summary of Results 
 
For ease of comparison, Table 23 lists observations, the specific changes over time, 
and the implications of the specific changes for each hypothesis. Each hypothesis – the 
superstar, long tail, and hybrid, respectively – are restated. Each relevant observation and 
specific change pertaining to each respective hypothesis is grouped together under the 














Table 26: Synopsis of Data Analysis Conclusions. 
Hypothesis 1. Superstar Hypothesis.  
The superstar hypothesis is that 
sales have become relatively 
more skewed toward hits 
over time. 
  
Observation. Specific Changes. Implications for Hypotheses.  
Percentage of sales accruing 
to each quantile of artists. 
(Table 4, Figure 11, Figure 
12). 
Market becomes more 
concentrated from 2004 to 
2006. 
Supports superstar 
hypothesis from 2004 to 
2006. 
Percentage of sales accruing 
to each quantile of titles. 
(Table 5, Figure 13, Figure 
14). 
Market becomes more 
concentrated from 2004 to 
2006. 
Supports superstar 
hypothesis from 2004 to 
2006. 
Percentage of sales accruing 
to each quantile of labels. 
(Table 6, Figure 15, Figure 
16). 
Market becomes more 
concentrated from 2004 to 
2006. 
Supports superstar 
hypothesis from 2004 to 
2006. 
Gini coefficients for artists. 
(Figure 17). 
Market becomes more 
concentrated from 2004 to 
2006. But, an earlier peak for 
digital, later peak for tracks. 
Supports superstar 
hypothesis from 2004 to 
2006. 
Gini coefficients for titles. 
(Figure 18). 
Market becomes more 
concentrated from 2004 to 
2006. But, an earlier peak for 
digital, later peak for tracks. 
Supports superstar 
hypothesis from 2004 to 
2006. 
Gini coefficients for labels. 
(Figure 19).  
Market becomes more 
concentrated from 2004 to 
2006. But, an earlier peak for 
digital. 
Supports superstar 
hypothesis from 2004 to 
2006. 
Gini coefficients for non-
zero artist sales. (Figure 20). 
Market becomes more 
concentrated from 2004 to 
2006. But, a later peak for 
tracks. 
Supports superstar 
hypothesis from 2004 to 
2006. 
Gini coefficients for non-
zero title sales. (Figure 21). 
Market becomes more 
concentrated from 2004 to 
2006. But, a later peak for 
tracks. 
Supports superstar 
hypothesis from 2004 to 
2006. 
Gini coefficients for non-
zero label sales. (Figure 22). 
Market becomes more 
concentrated from 2004 to 
2006. But, a later peak for 
non-digital. 
Supports superstar 
hypothesis from 2004 to 
2006. 




zero artists, titles, and labels. 
(Figure 20, Figure 21, Figure 
22). 
for all formats in 2008 than 
in 2004. 
hypothesis from 2004 to 
2008. 
The coefficient on Sales 
Rank decreases each year for 
artists for digital units and 
for tracks. (Table 15, Figure 
23). 
Market becomes more 
concentrated each year. 
Supports superstar 
hypothesis across sample 
period for digital units and 
for tracks.  
The coefficient on Sales 
Rank decreases each year for 
titles for digital units and for 
tracks. (Table 17, Figure 24). 
Market becomes more 
concentrated each year. 
Supports superstar 
hypothesis across sample 
period for digital units and 
for tracks. 
The coefficient on Sales 
Rank does not decrease each 
year for non-zero artist sales 
for digital units and tracks. 
(Table 19, Figure 25). 
There is no perceptible 
change in market 
concentration by this 
measure for these formats. 
Does not support superstar 
hypothesis for digital units 
and for tracks. 
The coefficient on Sales 
Rank decreases each year for 
non-zero title sales for digital 
units and for tracks.  (Table 
21, Figure 26).  
Market becomes more 
concentrated each year. 
Supports superstar 
hypothesis across sample 
period for digital units and 
for tracks. 
Hypothesis 2. Long Tail Hypothesis.  
The long tail hypothesis is that 
sales have become relatively 
less skewed toward hits and 
superstars over time. 
  
Observation. Specific Changes. Implications for Hypotheses.  
Percentage of sales accruing 
to each quantile of artists. 
(Table 4, Figure 11, Figure 
12). 
Market becomes less 
concentrated from 2006 to 
2008. 
Supports long tail 
hypothesis from 2006 to 
2008. 
Percentage of sales accruing 
to each quantile of titles. 
(Table 5, Figure 13, Figure 
14). 
Market becomes less 
concentrated from 2006 to 
2008. 
Supports long tail 
hypothesis from 2006 to 
2008. 
Percentage of sales accruing 
to each quantile of labels. 
(Table 6, Figure 15, Figure 
16). 
Market becomes less 
concentrated from 2006 to 
2008, but to a much smaller 
degree. 
Supports long tail 
hypothesis from 2006 to 
2008. But smaller in 
magnitude. 
Gini coefficients for artists. 
(Figure 17). 
Market becomes less 
concentrated from 2006 to 
2008. 
Supports long tail 
hypothesis from 2006 to 
2008. 
Gini coefficients for titles. 
(Figure 18). 
Market becomes less 
concentrated from 2006 to 
2008. 
Supports long tail 
hypothesis from 2006 to 
2008. 




(Figure 19). concentrated from 2006 to 
2008. 
hypothesis from 2006 to 
2008. 
Gini coefficients for non-
zero artist sales. (Figure 20). 
Market becomes less 
concentrated from 2006 to 
2008. 
Supports long tail 
hypothesis from 2006 to 
2008. But smaller in 
magnitude. 
Gini coefficients for non-
zero title sales. (Figure 21). 
Market becomes less 
concentrated from 2006 to 
2008. 
Supports long tail 
hypothesis from 2006 to 
2008. But smaller in 
magnitude. 
Gini coefficients for non-
zero label sales. (Figure 22). 
Market becomes less 
concentrated from 2006 to 
2008. 
Supports long tail 
hypothesis from 2006 to 
2008. But smaller in 
magnitude. 
Skewness declines each year 
for artists. (Table 9). 
Market becomes less 
concentrated each year. 
Supports long tail 
hypothesis across sample 
period. 
The coefficient on Sales 
Rank increases each year for 
artists for all unit sales and 
non-digital sales. (Table 15, 
Figure 23). 
Market becomes less 
concentrated each year. 
Supports long tail 
hypothesis across sample 
period for all unit sales and 
non-digital sales.  
The coefficient on Sales 
Rank increases each year for 
titles for all unit sales and 
non-digital sales. (Table 17, 
Figure 24). 
Market becomes less 
concentrated each year. 
Supports long tail 
hypothesis across sample 
period for all unit sales and 
non-digital sales.  
The coefficient on Sales 
Rank increases each year for 
non-zero artist sales for all 
unit sales and non-digital 
sales. (Table 19, Figure 25). 
Market becomes less 
concentrated each year. 
Supports long tail 
hypothesis across sample 
period for all unit sales and 
non-digital sales.  
The coefficient on Sales 
Rank increases each year for 
non-zero title sales for all 
unit sales and non-digital 
sales. (Table 21, Figure 26). 
Market becomes less 
concentrated each year. 
Supports long tail 
hypothesis across sample 
period for all unit sales and 
non-digital sales. 
Hypothesis 3. Hybrid Hypothesis.  
The hybrid hypothesis is a 
combination of the effects of 
the above two hypotheses. 
Also can be described as the 
‘shrinking middle class’ 
hypothesis. 
  
Observation. Specific Changes. Implications for Hypotheses.  
Inter-quartile measure 
decreases each year for 
‘Middle class’ of artists is 
shrinking. 




artists. (Table 9). 
Right tail inter-quartile 
measure decreases each year 
for artists. (Table 9). 
‘Middle class’ of artists is 
shrinking. 
Supports hybrid hypothesis. 
Inter-quartile measure 
decreases each year for titles. 
(Table 10). 
‘Middle class’ of titles is 
shrinking. 
Supports hybrid hypothesis. 
 
To reiterate, here are the hypotheses considered in light of the data analysis in this 
chapter: 
Hypothesis 1. There is a ‘superstar’ effect in the market for recorded music today. The superstar 
hypothesis is that sales have become relatively more skewed toward hits over time. The market 
becomes more concentrated from 2004 to 2006 judging by the Gini coefficients and the 
percentage of sales accruing to each quantile of titles, artists, and labels. Regardless of the 
rise and slight fall from 2004 to 2008 in the Gini coefficients, when zero sales are dropped 
each Gini coefficient ends up higher in 2008 than it was in 2004. This increased 
concentration lends support to the superstar hypothesis. The regression results show the 
coefficient on Sales Rank decreases each year for artists and titles for digital units and for 
tracks. So, there is a superstar effect in digital formats. This is not the case, however, for 
non-zero sales aggregated by artist, where the regression results show no conspicuous trend. 
Hypothesis 2. There is a ‘long-tail’ effect in the market for recorded music today that helps new 
or insurgent artists increase sales at the expense of established or incumbent artists. The long tail hypothesis is 
that sales have become relatively less skewed toward hits and superstars over time. The 
market becomes less concentrated from 2006 to 2008 judging by the Gini coefficients and 
the percentage of sales accruing to each quantile of titles, artists, and labels. The long tail 
effect is smaller in magnitude when only non-zero sales are analyzed. Skewness declines each 




hypothesis. The regression results show the coefficient on Sales Rank increases each year for 
artists and titles for all unit sales and non-digital sales. So, there is a long tail effect in non-
digital formats.  
Hypothesis 3. There is some combination of the ‘superstar’ and ‘long-tail’ effects. The hybrid 
hypothesis is a combination of the effects of the above two hypotheses. The inter-quartile 
measure decreases each year for artists and titles and the right tail inter-quartile measure 
decreases each year for artists. These observations support the hybrid ‘shrinking middle 







The methodology used to answer the research questions does not rely on any 
interpretation of the superstar hypothesis which requires defining an objective measure of 
talent and/or making assumptions about maximizing consumption behavior. The premise in 
this research is that there has been an increase in supply facilitated by technological and 
institutional changes. Accordingly, the sales distribution profile is observed over time to see 
if sales concentration has increased or decreased. There is still lively debate about whether or 
not the long tail effect is a reality and whether or not firms should invest in the idea as a 
business model informing their inventory offerings. Few studies have been able to utilize 
Nielsen Soundscan sales data and still fewer have samples this large and with a window of 
time this recent. 
 
A. Problem and Hypotheses 
 
Established business models of incumbent producers have been circumvented by the 
Internet and the Digital Revolution. The recorded music industry is in free fall because of a 
market failure: recorded music is not a private good because rivalness and excludability have 
vanished. Property rights over recorded music – and other creative content in other 




artists and bands presently benefit from the new democratized and decentralized 
marketplace. This new economic reality is being touted because is fosters niches and little-
known bands/artists and therefore meets more diverse consumer tastes because middlemen 
and intermediaries are out of the supply chain. But are consumers’ tastes really that diverse? 
Should producers and retailers cater to the idea that the public demands more variety? After 
all, this requires changes in business strategies, which is costly and risky. Have these recent 
changes in technology altered the ‘winner-take-all’ society and provided opportunity for a 
‘new artistic middle class’? 
Hypothesis 1. There is a ‘superstar’ effect in the market for recorded music today. The superstar 
hypothesis is that sales have become relatively more skewed toward hits over time. If the 
distribution of recorded music sales has shifted toward top quantiles over time at the 
expense of all the other quantiles, this hypothesis will be supported. 
Hypothesis 2. There is a ‘long-tail’ effect in the market for recorded music today that helps new 
or insurgent artists increase sales at the expense of established or incumbent artists. The long tail hypothesis is 
that sales have become relatively less skewed toward hits and superstars over time. If the 
distribution of recorded music sales has shifted toward bottom quantiles over time at the 
expense of all other quantiles, this hypothesis will be supported. 
Hypothesis 3. There is some combination of the ‘superstar’ and ‘long-tail’ effects. The hybrid 
hypothesis is a combination of the effects of the above two hypotheses. If the distribution of 
recorded music sales has shifted such that both top and bottom quantiles increase at the 







B. Findings and Implications  
 
Simply looking at sales trends over time, familiar patterns unfold. The decline in CD 
sales found in the sample is consistent with broad industry trends shown in Figure 4 from 
the RIAA. Digital unit sales, meaning bundled albums and singles sold via an online retail 
platform, have been on the rise. This trend is much touted in the industry as a success story. 
Unfortunately, this category of sales is comparatively small, and is not compensating for the 
drop in CD sales. The exploding numbers for unbundled track sales are quite dramatic. This 
says that consumers are more and more willing to pick and choose individual tracks instead 
of an entire album, if given the choice. For record companies and retailers, this change in 
availability of individual tracks is referred to as a shift from a ‘pure bundling’ strategy to a 
‘mixed bundling’ strategy where the album and all individual tracks are available separately. 
Elberse (2009) finds that this strategy lowers revenues, though revenues are not observable 
in the data used here. The album concept may be disappearing, but another observation is 
that LP album sales are rising. This is a niche market for audiophiles who, among other 
attributes, prefer analog sound over digital sound and value the album art that comes with 
the record.  
 The relative shares of sales accruing to the different quantiles of artists, titles, and 
labels show a general trend of rising concentration – a superstar effect – for the first three 
years, and declining concentration – a long tail effect – in the final two years. The top 1% 
steals the lion’s share of sales in each year for artists, titles, and labels. If artists, titles, and 
labels that sell zero are included, the Gini coefficients mirror this pattern of increasing and 
decreasing concentration. If only non-zero sales are included, the Gini coefficients for 




than they were in 2004. This corroborates the digital superstar effect. The remainder of the 
formats, all unit sales and non-digital, for artists, titles, and labels show no obvious trend 
when only non-zero sales are included. In general, from 2006 to 2008, there is a slight 
decline in concentration visible in the Gini coefficients for artists, titles, and labels. 
As far as the absolute levels of sales, the number of artists and titles who sell zero 
increases consistently each year. This probably reflects the increase in supply but also an 
increase in competition as the market is flooded with new artists/bands while demand for 
recorded music does not perceptibly shift or grow. The percentage of artists who sell one or 
more units remains about constant at 60%. The percentage of titles which sell one or more 
units declines slightly. This disparity between artists and titles is likely a result of mixed 
bundling because consumers are choosing individual tracks over album units over time. The 
album unit is aggregated as a title. For artists, skewness declines each year which implies less 
concentration. This is evidence for a long tail effect.  
The regression coefficients provide evidence of a long tail effect in all sales and non-
digital sales for artists and titles. On the other hand, there is evidence for a superstar effect in 
the digital formats: bundled digital units and unbundled digital tracks. So, there is evidence 
of a digital superstar effect and a non-digital long tail effect. This stands out because other 
researchers have found the opposite: a long tail effect in digital marketing channels when 
comparing the same products also sold in brick-and-mortar marketing channels 
(Brynjolfsson, Hu, and Simester 2007). It is likely that there are characteristics unique to 
recorded music when it comes to the consumption of cultural content akin to the snowball 
effect, which may accelerate with the new technological possibilities. For the regressions 
which include zero sales, all coefficients are significant and so are the tests for year-to-year 




significant, but many of the year-to-year differences are not statistically significant. The 
superstar and long tail effects are less obvious though still present when zero sales are 
chopped off. There is a differential effect visible in artists and in titles for non-zero sales 
only. For non-zero artist sales, the digital superstar effect is weakened while the non-digital 
long tail effect is still apparent. For non-zero title sales, the non-digital long tail effect is 
weakened while the digital superstar effect is still there. This is a matter of aggregation of 
sales over artists or over titles. It may be that many indie artists in the tail of the sales 
distribution have fans who prefer to purchase physical records while the fans of popular 
artists prefer digital content. This loyalty for artists does not show up in the individual titles. 
Perhaps popular artists in the head of the sales distribution have fans who purchase only 
certain superstar titles: albums and singles. 
Illegal digital consumption has been expanding. Illegal digital consumption has been 
demonstrated to be a superstar market (Page and Garland 2009). Illegal downloads are 
dominated by the more popular artists/bands. Less popular artists are not hurt as much by 
illegal digital consumption as popular artists are (Blackburn 2004). Little-known and new 
artists often release their music online for free anyway for marketing purposes. Less popular 
artists also would likely benefit minimally from releasing their music on legitimate online 
retail distribution platforms. This is because their volume of sales is so much less that it is 
not worth the cost for the artist or the retailer. More popular artists, backed by record labels, 
may be more ready to embrace legitimate Internet distribution for this reason. So, record 
label backing could be affecting outcomes here. This may help to explain the digital 
superstars effect. However, there is evidence that the long tail effect is present in overall 
sales measures and in non-digital formats. This may be because indie artists may focus more 




their fans and these remunerated sales show up in the long tail of the data set’s distribution 
profile.  
Most consumers may be illegally downloading due to income constraints and are 
maximizing their consumption of recorded music subject to this constraint. But other 
consumers feel the need to remunerate the artists/bands whose music they enjoy because of 
feelings of reciprocity. At the same time, many artists and their audiences, the world over, 
view making money as negative due to an ascetic aesthetic disposition (Bourdieu 1993, 1984). 
Indie rock, as a concept, revolves around the distinction of a lack of a mass audience or a 
lack of popularity. Popularity is considered ‘vulgar’. In that way, its fans can have the benefit 
of an exclusive aesthetic awareness (Hibbet 2005). Economically, this is a voluntary 
constraint on upward mobility, which might otherwise be observed in the sales distribution. 
Interestingly, this anti-mass market attitude does provide some social/cultural excludability. 
This does not show up in the legitimate transaction data used for this study, but may be an 
interesting avenue for future research.  
Recorded music has become non-rival because there is no scarcity. Recorded music 
has also become non-excludable because intellectual property rights are ever harder and 
costlier to enforce. A public good, which is the absence of rivalness and excludability, is a 
market failure. The long-tail-technological-institutional changes allow for non rivalness in 
inventory, which is economically positive for producers and consumers alike. The non 
rivalness in inter-individual consumption, i.e. copying and file sharing, is economically 
negative for popular content creators and owners because this decreases their revenues. On 
the other hand, it is economically positive for less-popular content creators and owners 
because they benefit from the free marketing and dissemination of their artwork. 




and copyright owners have lost much of the enforceability of their property rights. The end 
result is that recorded music prices are falling toward zero. 
Consumption rivalness is highly unlikely to come back in the digital era, so 
excludability is the only strategy for copyright holders. Will Page, of PRS for Music, a 
copyright collecting society in the U.K., suggests that bundling is the likely best response. 
This is the case as long as the reserve price or willingness to pay for the bundled good or 
content access, i.e. an album or a music subscription service, is less dispersed than the 
reserve price or willingness to pay for the unbundled parts, i.e. individual tracks. The 
marginal cost of digital music has become insignificant, so the task for the suppliers is to 
maximize revenue given that consumer reserve prices differ for different tracks or individual 
components. This is illustrated in Table 24. What is shown is a case where the retailer is 
deciding between a strategy of strict bundling and a strategy of strict unbundling, and not 
mixed bundling. One consumer, Ted, values Track 1 more than Track 2. Another consumer, 
Laura, values Track 2 more than Track 1. First, individual tracks could be sold separately at 
$1.00 a piece. In this case revenue would be $4.00. Second, individual tracks could be sold 
separately at $1.20 a piece. In that case revenue would only be $2.20 because one of the two 
tracks is not worth the price to each respective customer. However, if both Track 1 and 
Track 2 were bundled together and sold at the combined price of $2.20, which corresponds 
to the combined willingness to pay for each customer, both would buy the bundle and 
revenue would be maximized at $4.40. In this way the willingness to pay for the bundle is 






Table 27: The Willingness to Pay for a Bundle is Less 
Dispersed than the Willingness to Pay for Unbundled 
Components.  
The prices listed represent reserve prices for each person for the respective tracks. If all tracks were 
priced at $1.20 and sold separately, only two would sell: Ted would buy Track 1 and Laura would buy 
Track 2, and revenue would be $2.40. If all tracks were priced at $1.00 and sold separately, all four 
tracks would sell, and revenue would be $4.00. If Track 1 and Track 2 were bundled together and sold 
for $2.20 then revenue would rise to $4.40. Source: Page 2006. 
 
 Track 1 Track 2 
Ted  $1.20  $1.00 
Laura  $1.00  $1.20 
 
Elberse (2009) finds empirical evidence that the mixed bundling strategy lowers 
revenue compared with pure bundling. Mixed bundling, as mentioned earlier, is a case where 
the bundled album is available as a choice for the consumer but so are the individual 
unbundled tracks. Certain artists already prefer bundled albums for personal expression as an 
art form, but quite often retailers have bargaining power over artists and do not allow pure 
bundling strategies, e.g. iTunes. If the bundling of albums is less than successful, then 
bundling in the form of live performances and selling periodic access to bundled content 
through subscription services could reinstate some excludability. Artists and bands should 
have freedom in pricing albums and tracks as they see fit. An example of this where the artist 
is empowered to set price is CD Baby. CD Baby is both a record label and online 
distribution platform. This has potential to fight the general trend of falling prices of 
recorded music (Page 2006). 
Given the tendency toward the public good status of recorded music, the notion of 
the ‘tragedy of the anti-commons’ is relevant (Heller 1998, cited in Page 2006). The tragedy 
of the commons (Hardin 1968, cited in Page 2006) is a situation where a scarce resource is 




self-interest. The tragedy of the commons is caused by not enough excludability. The tragedy 
of the anti-commons, on the other hand, is a situation where many individuals acting 
separately in their own self-interest under-produce a scarce resource because there are too 
many rights holders. This is relevant to the recorded music industry in the context of the 
digital rights management (DRM) reaction to piracy as well as RIAA litigation. This 
enforcement response to the non-excludability problem of the public good is an attempt to 
make a resource scarce by enforcing a right of exclusion or property right in this case.  
 
“Because intellectual property is sharable […] and also because it’s invisible, making 
it difficult to ascertain boundaries, there is a lot more difficulty in implementing a 
system of exclusive property rights than we have with physical property.  And so 
there are dangers in trying to transport wholesale our system of physical property 
rights into intellectual property” (Posner 2004, 73). 
 
To curtail the growth of a black market for illegal copies of digital music, the Recording 
Industry Association of America (RIAA) sued Napster in late 1999. The RIAA won the 
lawsuit, but this was only one weed out of the garden for the trade group. These 
developments beg the question: how far should a society go to protect intellectual property 
rights? One line of research that has drawn a great amount of attention is Boldrin and Levine 
(2004). These authors argue that society has gone too far to protect intellectual property 
rights because any such rights granted by the government only enhance monopoly power. 
Monopoly power, so the economic argument goes, artificially inflates prices, curtails supply 
of the good/service, and hampers further innovative activity. Further, they assert that 
patents and copyrights are unnecessary because a perfectly competitive market provides a 
sufficient incentive structure for fostering innovation. However, incentives do matter and 
they are going away. If a person desires to be an artist, she faces the very real risk that the 




required to score gigs, perfect one’s craft, and hone one’s skills – could be subject to 
prohibitive opportunity costs.    
 Record labels are not investing in artists as much as they used to, and this is a 
reaction to the public good reality. But there is no scarcity, as noted before, because of the 
attribute of non-rivalness. However, as more people use a resource, the resource’s value or 
usefulness may increase due to the ‘comedy of the commons’ (Rose 1986 cited in Page 2006). 
This may have positive spillover effects onto other revenue streams such as merchandise or 
concert sales. 
Though the recorded music industry is becoming democratized and decentralized 
and artists are taking their music directly to consumers, it does not necessarily follow that 
intermediaries such as record labels and copyright collectives are going to become irrelevant. 
This is especially true if those artists want to make a living. Given the sales distribution 
profiles observed in this data, collecting societies, digital aggregators, and record labels, and 
others will still play an important role because these intermediaries are able to apply unique 
economies of scale (Page 2008). The extensive and flat tailed sales distribution that is 
observed above leads to a huge number of micro payments and granular transactions. These 
transactions originate from a wide range of diverse online platforms, such as YouTube, 
iTunes, and Rhapsody, and they accrue to a diverse pool of niche artists. This justifies the 
existence of collecting societies and copyright collectives which collect and distribute royalty 
payments to their members. Copyright collectives can find solutions to coordination 
problems, bring more artists into cooperation, and decrease transactions costs between 





C. Limitations of the Study and Future Research 
 
 There are several limitations to this research which are important to discuss. There is 
no information on the type of retailer from which individual unit sales go through. So 
analysis of marketing channels is not possible. There is also no information on the attributes 
of consumers making the purchases. Though it can be reasonably assumed that there has 
been a rightward shift in supply, changes in supply and demand cannot be separated with 
this data set. Therefore the changes in the distribution could be due to changes in music 
consumers’ preferences or retailers changing their inventory offerings. Nielsen also refused 
to give information on the number of titles and artists entering the marketplace each year. 
Having this information in the future would help to explain to what degree supply changes 
translate into sales distribution changes. 
 Unbundled digital tracks are of dramatic importance in this data set. However, due 
to contractual time limitations we were unable to visit the part of the Nielsen system which 
reports ‘digital tracks’ as a separate format. That is, the unbundled tracks analyzed here are 
unbundled from the albums and singles captured in the sample. But digital tracks as a 
separate format have their own product code and are tallied separately. Analyzing this format 
in relation to albums, singles, and unbundled tracks would be an interesting avenue for 
future research. More information about the characteristics of artists would benefit the 
analysis, but these were not made available by Nielsen. For example, any proliferation of 
niches, as Chris Anderson argues should exist, would be visible in the proliferation of genres 
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